USN Design and Operational Concepts

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Where the concepts behind USN designs and operations are discussed.

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Ship Design Concepts:

The New Navy

The first designs of the late 1880s and early 1890s were closely based on those of UK shipbuilders, either by building to designs from UK designers (USS Texas) or designs similar to designs from the UK (USS Maine).  The next series of designs (USS Indiana, USS New York) were home-grown, but influenced by the designs that had come before and by limits put on the size of the ships by the US Congress.  USS Indiana had a lower freeboard than the USN would have liked, to save tonnage.  USS Iowa used the new 12" guns to save weight that was put into higher freeboard.

The protected and armored cruisers of the New Navy differed little from those abroad, though the USN did not build any large protected cruisers, and preferred more, if smaller, main battery weapons than some countries.


Transitional Navy

The battleships of the mid-to-late 1890s were a transition from the coastal battleships of the New Navy to ships intended to operate freely in deep waters, though their size was still proscribed by Congress.  The USS Kentucky traded the Iowas 8" guns for higher freeboard and a casemated battery of 6" guns, and the Illinois and second Maine followed the same pattern (though Maine grew from the desire to increase speed from the 16 knots of the older ships to 18 knots).  While the Maine class ships were laid down after the Iberian-American war, their design dates from before the lessons of that war had been incorporated into USN design practice.

The follow-on cruisers followed the same paths as their predecessors: the armored cruisers of the Atlanta class replaced the New York's 8" guns with 10" guns, and 4" guns with 5" guns, but otherwise were quite recognizeable as larger examples of the same concept.  The protected cruisers of the Saint Paul and Montgomery classes were clearly larger Madison class designs, made larger to fit additional 6" guns and to allow an additional knot of speed.


Post-Iberian War Navy

The USN experience in the Iberian-American War centered around Santiago de Cuba and the battle that happened there.  The USN found that the 8" guns on the Wilmington and Olympia, at least against the relatively modern Iberian cruisers, lacked stopping power: Wilmington dueled with Vizcaya for most of an hour at ranges as close as 1000 yards, and could not stop her opponent until a torpedo exploded as it was being prepared by the enemy ship.  By contrast, the 12" guns on board Iowa and the 13" guns aboard Oregon hit with finality and threatened with authority. Cristobal Colon had beached herself when it was clear she was within range of the 13" guns on Oregon and Iowa had seriously damaged Infanta Maria Teresa before she became closely engaged with Olympia and had driven Almirante Oquendo to the beach in flames due to hits from guns of all calibers.  The USN had also noticed that, with a well-trained and drilled crew, there was not as large a difference in rate of fire between the 8" and 12" guns as had been thought: the crew aboard Iowa, heavily drilled by Robley "Fighting Bob" T. Evans, had worked it's 12" guns more rapidly than the 8" guns aboard Indiana.

When the time came to design the first post-Iberian War battleships, there was little interest in returning to mounting the 8" gun.  The Atlanta-class cruisers had replaced the 8" gun with a more powerful 10"/40 gun, so that was a possibility, or an even newer 10"/45 under development.  But 4 twin 10" turrets would weigh a lot, and their magazines would add more weight, cramp the corners of the ship, and be poorly protected by virtue of being at the corners of the hull and hence close to the sides of the ship.  A "stacked" turret arrangement offered some hope, by putting a twin 10" above the twin 12" guns at the ends of the ship, but again it was heavy, and added lots of weight high up.  And the 10", while a good gun, was not the equal of a 12"/40.

The group that was most impressed by the performance of the 12" guns wanted a design with triple 12" turrets at the ends of the ship, but there was not enough time to create a new turret design, test it, and update the design before 1902, at the barest minimum.  There simply were no triple turret designs to work from, it would have to be done from scratch, and the drill and training, especially for the middle gun, would have to be created.   If 6 12" guns were going to be fitted, they would have to be mounted in twin turrets, with one turret in a position where it would have more limited arcs of fire than the others.

The meetings in 1899 to determine the design of the 1900 BB class (what would become USS Nebraska) were stormy: if 6 12" guns (or 4 or 8 10" guns) were to be fitted, the ship's size would have to be considerably larger than the preceding Maine class.  Would Congress pay for it?  What would the effect of topweight from 10" guns stacked atop 12" guns be?  Were 12" guns needed at all, or would the USN be better served going to a uniform battery of 10" guns (the first idea rejected)?  Eventually, the stacked 10" over 12" gun was rejected, on account of too much weight too high up and a suspicion that if 4 10" guns would be good, 2 more 12" guns would be better.  Then the 4 12" and 8 10" gun ship was rejected: she was too large, and again, 6 12" guns might well be better than 4 12" and 4 10" per broadside, at least against other battleships where the 10" gun might well have problems penetrating outside the increasing torpedo ranges (the latest torpedoes were reaching 3000 yards).  A late addition to the designs under consideration used the same "stacked turret" idea, but to mount 2 6" guns over the 12" guns.  This was eventually accepted for the 1900 battleship as it offered the opportunity to increase secondary gun coverage without festooning the ship with 6" guns in places that would either be washed out in a bathtub or would interfere with the operating of the ship.

A design using similar concepts to the 1900 BB was adopted for a new AC (using the stacked turret design, but with the 6" guns over 10" guns), but a second AC design was also accepted, this one dispensing with the stacked turrets.  The reason behind the change was manufacturing: no West Coast shipyard was willing to build the design without a large indemnity clause that the USN was unwilling to sign.  Cramp's yard in Philadelphia had no such concerns, and the New York Navy Yard was a government facilty, so the East Coast yards were willing.  The two designs would also give a useful point of comparison on the values, positive and negative, of the stacked turrets.

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Wireless communications

As the old 19th Century faded into history and the new 20th Century dawned, the USN found itself in the awkward position of desiring something but not knowing exactly what it desired.  As an institution, it knew that it wanted the new wireless communications, but it didn't know which one it wanted, or really whether there were substantive differences between the different providers.  The international Marconi company was the most famous of these providers, but the USN was absolutely unwilling to lease it's hardware and have it's employees aboard the Navy's ships.  Other providers proferrered their solutions, each tossing out more and more extravagant claims, with no way for the Navy to tell what was truth and what was, at best, marketing hyperbole, when they weren't out and out lies.

As the century turned, most ships under construction in the yards were ordered with provisions for fitting a wireless, but in most cases (to the relief of the Bureau of Equipment), there was time yet to determine what equipment was to be fitted.  For the new torpedo-boat destroyers of the Bainbridge class, though, a decision had to be made, and made quickly.  Based on a minimal amount of testing, the Bainbridge and Barry were fitted with sets provided by Nikola Tesla from his lab in Colorado Springs.  While those units were being fitted out, testing of shore stations was being started in Washington, DC, Newport News, and Baltimore, using equipment provided by both domestic and foreign manufacturers.  Ship-board tests of prospective shipboard units were made aboard various and sundry Atlantic Fleet vessels and auxiliaries.

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1900 USN Thoughts on ship types


USN Thoughts: Submarines

In 1900, the collective thought of the USN on submarines could be summed up as:
"These things are tiny and limited, but they might be useful as small coastal defense vessels, able to damage and degrade a blockading enemy outside a US port.  They might also have limited value as blockading vessels, though not so much against merchants as against warships of an enemy."

The initial boats ordered by the USN, the Holland-designed Adder-class, are intended primarily as training vessels for the first role, to see if the concept even worked.  With their slow speed and limited armament, can they be effective in fleet problems against a part of the fleet acting as a blockading enemy?  Can they be more effective than torpedo boats (which would be much faster and more maneuverable, but also more easily spotted and vulnerable)?  The boats would also be used for training the surface navy in dealing with the threat of submarines, as reports filed by various naval attaches pointed out that other navies were also working on submarines, and often buying more than the USN is.


USN Thought: Torpedo Boats and Torpedo Boat Destroyers

The USN has never been a fan of the torpedo boat, regarding them as at best a short-ranged unit that could have some value in attacking an enemy that was blockading a US port.  They could, to the USN's collective thinking, be considered a longer-ranged version of a coast defence torpedo.  Small numbers were purchased for testing and training purposes, but no large-scale production has been undertaken.   A number of designs have been commissioned, however, and are kept up to date in case wartime production is deemed necessary.  The existing USN TBs are used for torpedo testing and for training.

The USN is a bit more inclined towards the larger torpedo boat destroyer, even though the Iberian Furor and Pluton were sunk or run aground outside Santiago de Cuba.  The larger size of the TBD allows it to have more range and better seakeeping, qualities that the post-Iberian American War USN approves of.  Construction of new TBDs of the Bainbridge class is continuing at a relatively low rate.  The TBDs are used in the same ways as the TBs, they have not yet been assigned to the fleets.


USN Thought: Cruisers

The USN sees cruisers as scouts for the fleet, for running down commerce raiders, as commerce raiders themselves, and as general show-the-flag ships.  In 1900, there are no new classes under construction as their size and current engine technology is making it very difficult to keep a speed advantage over the more powerful armored cruisers.  Another issue with the current protected cruiser design is that the value of coal as protection is poorly understood, but it's very clear that as a bunker empties it loses whatever protective value it had.  With the likely adoption of oil fuel in the future replacing coal, the protective coal bunker is likely to vanish in future designs.


USN Thought: Armored Cruisers

The USN sees armored cruisers as a fast wing to the battle line, able to deal with cruisers but not intended to stand in the line of battle against battleships.  While their main battery guns are capable of penetrating battleship armor at short ranges, a fleet commander would be wise to remember that tonnage the battleships put into armor, armored cruisers generally used on speed.   There is interest in investigating a smaller armored cruiser design as a possible future replacement for the protected cruisers.


USN Thought: Battleships

The USN's collective thought, as promulgated by Admiral Dewey and Captain Mahan, is that the battleship is the core of the fleet, the hard nut that an enemy must crack before they can defeat the fleet.  Firepower and protection are emphasized in USN battleship design over speed, on the theory that if an enemy must deal with the battleships before they can claim control of the sea, speed is of lesser import than those factors.  (Another reason the USN emphasizes firepower and armor over speed is that speed is very expensive in terms of cost & displacement, which the US Congress has historically kept a very close eye upon.  The USN will be very grateful to the RN for the Incomparable-class ships, which the USN will be able to point to for years in their budget requests.)

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USN Thoughts: Monitors

The USN has, in 1901, no further plans for monitor-type vessels except possibly for very special purposes.  The last class of monitors, equipped with a twin 12"/40 turret, is expected to give good service in the Caribbean, but no further members of the class are expected to be procured.  There is some thought being given to a "canal gunboat", for service on the Nicaraguan canal, but this would be a smaller vessel and probably of a more conventional warship design.