New Government in Holland.

[Carthaginian]

What blockade was that again, sir?

Uh, THIS one... you know, the on that killed 95% of the Confederacy's revenue!
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_blockade

And man-on man, supplied equally, Grant would have attrition-ed the Germans to death.
Trying to fight an invasion, his attrition warfare strategy would have killed him before he saw green grass.

That being said... the tank looks like someone tried to build a Bradley AFV in 1920.

That tank was based off the Fiat 2000 with a couple of design changes as noted here:

The Italians built one in 1917 called the Fiat 2000.

http://mailer.fsu.edu/~akirk/tanks/Italy/ItalianTanks.html

Lighten by ten tons, and cut down the top deck by one full meter with the same engine. Use a Holt tractor as the underdesign.

Fiat 2000 - Model 17

The first Italian tank. It was conceived by Fiat as a private venture in October 1916. The first prototype was ready in June 1917. Fiat donated 2 tanks to Italian Army in February 1918. Total production until the end of 1919. encompassed 6 vehicles. Arguably the finest heavy tank built in WW1 and a great "what if...". The Fiat 2000 never saw combat. For more detail, go to: TANKS! e-Magazine Winter 2001 Issue #2
Specifications Crew     10
Engine     240hp - gasoline
Weight     40 tons
Speed     4.5 - 6mph (depending on the source)
Armament     6 x MG, 1 x 65mm Main Gun
Length     24' 3"
Width     10' 2"
Height     12' 5"
Armor     15 - 20mm.

Not too far off for something with only a half-inch of armor... speed or otherwise.
Easily knocked out by anything over a .50 caliber round, but a real pain in the ass for infantry to handle alone (as heavy machine guns were still kind of 'special' about now).

D... IT LOOKS LIKE A BRADLEY- ya know, superficially visually resembles one

[damocles]

What blockade was that again, sir?

Uh, THIS one... you know, the on that killed 95% of the Confederacy's revenue!
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Union_blockade

And man-on man, supplied equally, Grant would have attrition-ed the Germans to death.
Trying to fight an invasion, his attrition warfare strategy would have killed him before he saw green grass.

The thing about that is that we assume that Grant could not land at Lisbon or that the Germans could sustain themselves in Portugal. (He can. If Scott can fight in Mexico in 1848 or Grant in Mississippi in 1863 then he can duplicate Wellington).

The Union imposed its "blockade" by actually landing and seizing Confederate ports (about a good half of the Federal armies did this with half their combat operations, when you add the Civil War fighting all up), so Grant coming ashore is not the problem.

Sustainability (assuming the British get involved) is the problem. Otherwise, its a French Marine versus USN situation, then. The rest of the Euro navies are frankly jokes, or defacto US allies (Russia). I'm not convinced the USN could win that fight against the French Marine, 1860-1872.

http://navalwarfare.blogspot.com/2010/01/uss-new-ironsides.html



Notice US 1861 state of the art.

 

That is a French battleship, the Solferino. By 1872 they had much better in the water.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/French_ship_Oc%C3%A9an_%281870%29

If Grant is going anywhere near Europe he needs THIS:



Uploaded with ImageShack.us

Built in quantity (at least 20 of them)

Hypothetical of course
   

That being said... the tank looks like someone tried to build a Bradley AFV in 1920.

That tank was based off the Fiat 2000 with a couple of design changes as noted here:

The Italians built one in 1917 called the Fiat 2000.

http://mailer.fsu.edu/~akirk/tanks/Italy/ItalianTanks.html

Lighten by ten tons, and cut down the top deck by one full meter with the same engine. Use a Holt tractor as the underdesign.

Fiat 2000 - Model 17

The first Italian tank. It was conceived by Fiat as a private venture in October 1916. The first prototype was ready in June 1917. Fiat donated 2 tanks to Italian Army in February 1918. Total production until the end of 1919. encompassed 6 vehicles. Arguably the finest heavy tank built in WW1 and a great "what if...". The Fiat 2000 never saw combat. For more detail, go to: TANKS! e-Magazine Winter 2001 Issue #2
Specifications Crew     10
Engine     240hp - gasoline
Weight     40 tons
Speed     4.5 - 6mph (depending on the source)
Armament     6 x MG, 1 x 65mm Main Gun
Length     24' 3"
Width     10' 2"
Height     12' 5"
Armor     15 - 20mm.

Not too far off for something with only a half-inch of armor... speed or otherwise.
Easily knocked out by anything over a .50 caliber round, but a real pain in the ass for infantry to handle alone (as heavy machine guns were still kind of 'special' about now).

D... IT LOOKS LIKE A BRADLEY- ya know, superficially visually resembles one

Well, in engineering, there is a saying. Common problem (resist MG fire and shell splinters) x CHEAP= common shaped solution.  Those Fiat engineers were not stupid in 1916.  

[Kaiser Kirk]

1. No cavalry on Earth could have operated in the Wilderness then and succeeded. The fact that Union cavalry actually tried to pass through that JUNGLE does them credit. I'm surprised that Grant was able to cross the river there and forced Lee back-especially after he, Grant, was badly flanked.

1&2. The failure was from the Wilderness to Spotsylvania, simple things like screening and posting guides. The poor maps made this more critical. To me, this failure of Sheridan's cavalry to provide essential functions to the AoP would indicate he wasn't the premier cavalryman of the Civil war, he should have been left as an Infantry Corps commander.

3. Grant gets the blame for Shiloh, but I excuse it as early in his career as a general, he improved as he learned. Cedar Creek was late in Sheridan's career, and while- like Shiloh- it came out acceptably in the end for him, it wasn't really due to his tactical brilliance so much as superior forces and the ability to rally. Even that comes out poorly, "One of Early's key subordinates, Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon, in his 1904 memoirs, attested that it was Early's decision to halt the attack for six hours in the early afternoon, and not disorganization in the ranks, that led to the rout that took place in the afternoon"- Early blamed it on the troops being exhausted and stopping to loot the camp, either way Sheridan was granted the gift of time.  Early was later relieved of command.

1. The numbers were 2/1 with Stuart having carbine-armed cavalry and no artillery-which artillery Sheridan had, fortunately. The battle was a misuse of Union cavalry in popular history reported, as the AotP desperately needed its screen to slow down the ANV: so the popular view is that the actual raid was pointless.

Yes, 2:1 in Sheridan's favor, and the Union were better equipped with both the repeaters and the artillery. Note that while Sheridan failed at Spotsylvania- thus loosing the edge Grant gained, his gallavanting off to Yellow Tavern coincides with the Union army walking into the trap a North Anna- only illness in the Confederate command prevented disaster. Sheridan rejoined Grant on the 24th, two days after the start of North Anna.
At this point in the war, the Confederate cavalry was overmatched, little to do with Sheridan. Even so, the Confederate cavalry could still contest the issue after that, and did repulse the Union Cav at Haw's Shop and Trevillian Station after Yellow Tavern.

Wade Hampton replaced Stuart, not Early- I don't believe he was ever the Cavalry commander. And claiming that Stuart was incompentent is an odd way to highlight the importance of beating him...or explain why it took until 1864.

You are wrong

Frequently, but I don't think so in this case :)
I asserted that "I don't think he was adequate for independent Corps command"
Which  Is correct, as I don't believe he was.

The pdf does not show that Sheridan was adequate for independent command. The PDF shows he was given one- and won battles when the odds were 3:1 in his favor, yet still made twin fundemental errors- First believing he had driven Early completely from the valley to extent he started transferring troops, and second allowing himself to be surprised at Cedar Creek.  Somehow despite his superior force, including 3 divisions of cavalry, he appears to have failed to maintain contact with the foe and the initiative.

The PDF I cited earlier explains what he was up against as to the art of war. The miracle is that with Granny Lee throwing up earthworks everywhere that Grant still turned those works no less than eleven times and kept driving Lee back. The casualties were 2 attackers for every defender, as opposed to the 7-1 expected.

I gave Grant credit for persistence, heck I called him 'Very good'. There are some flaws at the high command level, and the way he coordinated Meade/Burnside and Sheridan was not terribly good.  As for a 7-1 "expected" - that is silly as it simply wasn't seen on a large scale - not at Cold Harbor, not a Fredericksburg - only on smaller scales such as the field before Marye's Heights. However, Wilderness wasn't against Lee's earthworks and he took 3:2 casualties, same as Spotsylvania.  Fredericksberg was 2:1, Cold Harbor 3:1.  So 7-1 is just not a reasonable expectation based on actual battle results.

What about from the German border to Paris with a bumbler like Nappie III as defender/commander? Sheridan was qualified to make the call. I don't agree with him, but he was a proven general. If Burnside had said it, then I would agree with you as to incompetence.  

Sheridan was better than Burnside, but folks forget that Burnside argued against being promoted, he knew wasn't up for Army command...and then proved it.

We apparently disagree that Sheridan was qualified to make the call. I see nothing in his Civil War performance to indicate a grand view of the strategic picture.  His failure to appreciate the distance, terrain, supply difficulties, and the presence of large forts at strategic points ...in addition to the various armies..lead me to believe the statement was mere bluster, not a well considered rational and logical response.

[damocles]

1. No cavalry on Earth could have operated in the Wilderness then and succeeded. The fact that Union cavalry actually tried to pass through that JUNGLE does them credit. I'm surprised that Grant was able to cross the river there and forced Lee back-especially after he, Grant, was badly flanked.

1&2. The failure was from the Wilderness to Spotsylvania, simple things like screening and posting guides. The poor maps made this more critical. To me, this failure of Sheridan's cavalry to provide essential functions to the AoP would indicate he wasn't the premier cavalryman of the Civil war, he should have been left as an Infantry Corps commander.

There are some things you have to know about the Northern Virginia around Richmond of 1864. That place had some plantation cultivation and it had a road network of sorts and small communities dotted where the deer and wagon trails crossed;p but aside from that, it was a hellhole of wilderness growth scrub forests, dust terrain, and swamp. The soil, today, has a century and half of modern agriculture tendure and loaming to build it up to where it can support dairy and feed crops, but back then it was useless, as either a food producer, or cultivation for anything; but trees, brush, weeds (think tobacco and cotton as they genuinely are.). The ground today, churned up by traffic, turns to a gluey clay and will not hold a tank or a horse. It isn't the Northern European Plain at all. It is recently raised Atlantic ocean seafloor with all that geologically means.

Now what that means to an American army in 1864, that still struggles with the transition between Napoleonic and modern infantry tactics, is that their cavalry (the last thing on their minds as they try to learn how to transition from formal infantry line of battle to open skirmish order), is going to have severe terrain problems, because I don't care what anyone claims, unless you really know basic horsemanship; you are going to have a lot of trouble just riding a horse through those close packed woods.

That means you are more of less stuck and channeled on the roads and trails, doesn't it?

Now then...

You are US Grant and you just finished with a debacle (Chattanooga) where you played rescue the Army of the Tennessee. You have the thankless task of being Lincoln's fire brigade. Something goes wrong, Lincoln sends you to fix it. That was what Grant did at this point in the Civil War. He babysat troubled Union Armies and mentored Union generals in trouble so that they could learn how not to get beaten. He did this with Hooker, Meade, Thomas, Sherman, and every lousy corps commander in the Army of the Potomac, ALL of them.                        

So what did he find with the AoP cavalry when he looked in on Meade? He found it had been beefed up by Hooker to actually be the recon force that Hooker wanted, but did not get at Chancellorsville, and that "Kill Cavalry" Kilpatrick and then that IDIOT Pleasanton had more or less misused it and ruined it since.

Grant fired Pleasanton and looked for the meanest son of a _____ general he could find that he knew, to whip the horse arm into shape in a hurry, because he was going to need them when he chased Lee.

That man was Sheridan.

http://www.boardgamegeek.com/thread/529697/phil-sheridan-in-the-civil-war-bad-boy-or-bad-g

In summary, Sheridan took an arm over that was nothing like the cavalry the western Union armies enjoyed and he made those Eastern tyros horsemen. By Appomattox they were able alone, to slice the ANV in two by a simple road movement and force Lee to quit. Grant and Meade were still a half day away when Sheridan caught the rebels and split that column. He hung on until the Union infantry arrived ten hours late.    
   

3. Grant gets the blame for Shiloh, but I excuse it as early in his career as a general, he improved as he learned. Cedar Creek was late in Sheridan's career, and while- like Shiloh- it came out acceptably in the end for him, it wasn't really due to his tactical brilliance so much as superior forces and the ability to rally. Even that comes out poorly, "One of Early's key subordinates, Maj. Gen. John B. Gordon, in his 1904 memoirs, attested that it was Early's decision to halt the attack for six hours in the early afternoon, and not disorganization in the ranks, that led to the rout that took place in the afternoon"- Early blamed it on the troops being exhausted and stopping to loot the camp, either way Sheridan was granted the gift of time.  Early was later relieved of command.

It was Early's job to organize pursuit. Sheridan, when he arrived, found the Army of the Shenandoah scattered, no command structure at all, just a mob. Six hours later he had it in good tactical order and routing out Early's men.  John Gordan was a decent general, but he's also prone to make excuses, exaggerations, and is a known liar in his memoirs, as what he says bears no resemblance to reality as we know it now. Finally, give a good general six hours and you deserve the results. Early got what he deserved.      

1. The numbers were 2/1 with Stuart having carbine-armed cavalry and no artillery-which artillery Sheridan had, fortunately. The battle was a misuse of Union cavalry in popular history reported, as the AotP desperately needed its screen to slow down the ANV: so the popular view is that the actual raid was pointless.

Yes, 2:1 in Sheridan's favor, and the Union were better equipped with both the repeaters and the artillery. Note that while Sheridan failed at Spotsylvania- thus loosing the edge Grant gained, his gallavanting off to Yellow Tavern coincides with the Union army walking into the trap a North Anna- only illness in the Confederate command prevented disaster. Sheridan rejoined Grant on the 24th, two days after the start of North Anna.

Again, you have to know the ground and the way American cavalry fought. They were dragoons, not lancers, or cuirassiers. They tended to dismount and fight with the carbine or repeater from cover. If they fought ahorse it was with the revolver, not the saber.

 

That is UPHILL, chasing Confederates all the way.  

As for North Anna:

http://civilwar.bluegrass.net/battles-campaigns/1864/640523-26.html

Grant was given his day's grace, and Lee paid for it. Note also, that for once Wilson did as ordered, and this cavalry ruse completely befuddled the Confederates as to Grant's intentions. They (Lee) looked left while he moved past them toward  Cold Harbor.  

At this point in the war, the Confederate cavalry was overmatched, little to do with Sheridan. Even so, the Confederate cavalry could still contest the issue after that, and did repulse the Union Cav at Haw's Shop and Trevillian Station after Yellow Tavern.

http://www.johnsmilitaryhistory.com/haws.html

Again, know the terrain and the methods of combat, plus the fact that the Confederates this time had numbers, infantry support and artillery and the Union did not. Gregg whipped them nonetheless. After seven hours the Confederates ran. Gregg held the fords as ordered. Custer flanked the rebels and peeled the South Carolinians like an orange. Note here, that it was Sheridan who sent Custer in to reinforce Gregg with those exact orders he gave Custer.

Wade Hampton replaced Stuart, not Early- I don't believe he was ever the Cavalry commander. And claiming that Stuart was incompetent is an odd way to highlight the importance of beating him...or explain why it took until 1864.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Trevilian_Station

With IDIOTS, like Custer, as your subordinates; you have to ask why it took a Sheridan to beat Stuart, Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and Early? Note also that Trevillian Station was a success and that Sheridan won and HE was the reason why he won.  

You are wrong

Frequently, but I don't think so in this case :)
I asserted that "I don't think he was adequate for independent Corps command"
Which is correct, as I don't believe he was.

The pdf does not show that Sheridan was adequate for independent command. The PDF shows he was given one- and won battles when the odds were 3:1 in his favor, yet still made twin fundamental errors- First believing he had driven Early completely from the valley to extent he started transferring troops, and second allowing himself to be surprised at Cedar Creek.  Somehow despite his superior force, including 3 divisions of cavalry, he appears to have failed to maintain contact with the foe and the initiative.

You misread the campaign as described then. Sheridan had two missions, neutralize Early's raids into Pennsylvania and Maryland, and burn the Shenandoah to the ground. He was not supposed to chase Early, but make Early chase him. That was the whole Cedar Creek thing in a nutshell. About the troops thing: when Butler got himself trapped in the Bermuda Hundred, and Grant needed troops to rescue that fool (see Fire Brigade reference above), was Sheridan supposed to say no? He thought it was possible so he sent Grant the extras. Was he wrong? No, as it turns out, he was not, as he beat Early with what he had left. Also do not confuse Hunter and Wright debacles with Sheridan. In addition, half of the Confederate cavalry in Virginia was with Early in the Valley. It kept getting beat up by Sheridan's horsemen at places like  Winchester, Fisher's Hill and especially Tom's Brook where the Confederates were really mauled.    

"That's General Custer, the Yanks are so proud of,
   and I intend to give him the best whipping today that he ever got,"

       Confederate Major General Tom Rosser on the eve of the battle.

Rosser ran into Torbert's brigades instead, Custer made his late appearance and Rosser was forced to run for his life.

http://www.nps.gov/history/hps/abpp/shenandoah/svs3-14.html

Notice where Sheridan was?

The PDF I cited earlier explains what he was up against as to the art of war. The miracle is that with Granny Lee throwing up earthworks everywhere that Grant still turned those works no less than eleven times and kept driving Lee back. The casualties were 2 attackers for every defender, as opposed to the 7-1 expected.

I gave Grant credit for persistence, heck I called him 'Very good'. There are some flaws at the high command level, and the way he coordinated Meade/Burnside and Sheridan was not terribly good.  As for a 7-1 "expected" - that is silly as it simply wasn't seen on a large scale - not at Cold Harbor, not a Fredericksburg - only on smaller scales such as the field before Marye's Heights. However, Wilderness wasn't against Lee's earthworks and he took 3:2 casualties, same as Spotsylvania.  Fredericksberg was 2:1, Cold Harbor 3:1.  So 7-1 is just not a reasonable expectation based on actual battle results.

Not so fast, shall we? The point I made her,e is that if Grant (Meade) had stuck to McClellan/Hooker tactics and ways of doing things; those losses were to be expected in the present 1864 scheme of things. By now, the boys in blue knew about covering fire, short rushes, and shooting from cover. The fighting in the Wilderness was from breastwork and dead ground to dead ground for the most part. The AoP did not have to be told to dig in when they made contact with the ANV. As soon as the shooting started, the infantry became prairie dogs.



http://www.usa-civil-war.com/Wilderness/wilderness.html

Where it was in the open, it was fought at those intersections I mentioned and it was bloody close as well as near equal murder.          

What about from the German border to Paris with a bumbler like Nappie III as defender/commander? Sheridan was qualified to make the call. I don't agree with him, but he was a proven general. If Burnside had said it, then I would agree with you as to incompetence.  

Sheridan was better than Burnside, but folks forget that Burnside argued against being promoted, he knew wasn't up for Army command...and then proved it.

What Burnside was, was incapable of adapting to changes in plans. At Fredericksburg (a dreadful battle) and at the Battle of the Crater, he actually drew up some good plans, but failed to adapt when (weather) at Fredericksburg, and (politics, don't give the specially trained African American shock troops the glory) at the Crater threw his timing off. Instead of rolling with the changes, he tended to bull ahead right ahead never deviating from the plan into a disaster. At Freddyburg, once the mud march set in, it meant he couldn't beat Lee to the fords. He should have occupied the high ground on his side of the river and let Lee come to him. At the Crater, he should have delayed a day, so Upton could train the new designated Euro-American troops in the storm tactics to be attempted.              

We apparently disagree that Sheridan was qualified to make the call. I see nothing in his Civil War performance to indicate a grand view of the strategic picture.  His failure to appreciate the distance, terrain, supply difficulties, and the presence of large forts at strategic points ...in addition to the various armies..lead me to believe the statement was mere bluster, not a well considered rational and logical response.

I supplied several examples where Sheridan positioned himself or led from key points in a battle to make sure that his subordinates knew exactly what he wanted and intended. When they did as he told them or when he directly intervened, the results were victory-always. Not even the overrated Lee could claim that record.

I guess we do not agree about Sheridan. But I want you to know why I look at Sheridan's revisionist critics and dismiss them. Its easy for them to look at a map and numbers and criticize . Its not easy to look at the ground he had to fight, and know the raw material he had to use in men and horse, and not admire that little bastard's accomplishments against the likes of "the Virginia Cavaliers".

I mean he was able to whip them, even with fools like Custer and Gregg!  

[Carthaginian]

Damocles-
I am aware that much of the Union Army's effort was in capturing ports- especially the Mississippi river ports. I am well aware of 'the parrot shells a-sangin' though the air' in Vicksburg.
HOWEVER, this was NOT the 'primary method of blockade.' There was a real, working blockade on the high seas- one which was a primary source of the Confederacy's claims of de jure as well as de facto independence. Only a foreign belligerent can be blockaded; rebellious ports are 'closed.' The Union used the word 'blockade' not without a great deal of trepidation and with full awareness that they were proving that the South was no longer under their control... so it is NOT something that was 'secondary to the Army's operations' as you seem to insist. It was an expensive operation that literally DOUBLED the size of the Union navy and put virtually all of it to sea.

I am also damnably aware of the 'state of the art' in naval vessels... Dixie was the one building them (if only by contract in England).
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h48000/h48145.jpg
The North Carolina, for your perusal.
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h52000/h52526.jpg
And her sister, the Mississippi, in H.M.'s Royal Navy service as the Wyvern.
The ordering of these ships, the previously mentioned Stonewall and several others are clearly proof that the Confederacy was at least equally concerned about something on the high seas strangling the life out of them as they were about having their ports closed one by one.

Oh, did you ever think that maybe- just POSSIBLY, mind you- the reason the Union was able to 'close the ports with their armies' was the fact that the blockade meant that the Confederate armies were so poorly supplied that they could not hold their ground against Union assault? You are attempting to allow the cart to pull the horses, Damocles. Without the blockade, the Union would never have been able to close the ports... the Confederate forces would have been exporting enough cotton and importing enough material that your vaunted army actions against the ports would never have taken place.

Oh... that Frog broadside ship would have been the least of anyone's worries in 1872.
I'd be far more afraid of the Taureau should I be coming into close proximity to the French coast,

[damocles]

Damocles-
I am aware that much of the Union Army's effort was in capturing ports- especially the Mississippi river ports. I am well aware of 'the parrot shells a-sangin' though the air' in Vicksburg.

Good. See below for why that matters.  

HOWEVER, this was NOT the 'primary method of blockade.' There was a real, working blockade on the high seas- one which was a primary source of the Confederacy's claims of de jure as well as de facto independence. Only a foreign belligerent can be blockaded; rebellious ports are 'closed.' The Union used the word 'blockade' not without a great deal of trepidation and with full awareness that they were proving that the South was no longer under their control... so it is NOT something that was 'secondary to the Army's operations' as you seem to insist. It was an expensive operation that literally DOUBLED the size of the Union navy and put virtually all of it to sea.

The USN in 1860 consisted of scarce 40 ocean going vessels. By 1864 that was a going concern with almost 300 ocean going vessels, almost 100 of them being various "sloops of war" and the rest, gunboats in one form or another. Counting the Eades fleets, there were scarce 30 ironclads in the USN at any one time during the US Civil War.

The Confederate coast had 8 major usable ports and 300 usable smuggling inlets, as well as the huge Mississippi Delta, Mobile Bay, the extensive island shield off North Carolina, Savannah, Charleston, and the Floridas. That is over 13,000 miles of CSA coastline plus French Mexico via Texas to "blockade". Interdict here is the correct term. Blockade was impossible-especially as there were a dozen or more US cruisers chasing Confederate raiders up and down the Atlantic, while British and French captains in fast steamers were routinely running the blockade out of the Bahamas and Jamaica.        

I am also damnably aware of the 'state of the art' in naval vessels... Dixie was the one building them (if only by contract in England).
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h48000/h48145.jpg
The North Carolina, for your perusal.
http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/images/h52000/h52526.jpg
And her sister, the Mississippi, in H.M.'s Royal Navy service as the Wyvern.
The ordering of these ships, the previously mentioned Stonewall and several others are clearly proof that the Confederacy was at least equally concerned about something on the high seas strangling the life out of them as they were about having their ports closed one by one.

You are kidding right?

http://www.cityofart.net/bship/wivern.html

Those were Lairds RAMS, desiigned to destroy the New Ironsides and Monitor and ships like them, if those showed up to support and cover the armies that were knocking over places like Fort Fisher and closing down Confederate ports:

http://www.nchistoricsites.org/fisher/fisher.htm  

How were they going to cross the Atlantic to take up their coastal defense roles without being ocean going at least once?

Oh, did you ever think that maybe- just POSSIBLY, mind you- the reason the Union was able to 'close the ports with their armies' was the fact that the blockade meant that the Confederate armies were so poorly supplied that they could not hold their ground against Union assault? You are attempting to allow the cart to pull the horses, Damocles. Without the blockade, the Union would never have been able to close the ports... the Confederate forces would have been exporting enough cotton and importing enough material that your vaunted army actions against the ports would never have taken place.

http://www.nchistoricsites.org/fisher/blockade.htm

http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/wars_american_civil_war09_waratsea.html

Ironically, the determined Confederate attempts to get Britain to declare against the blockade played a part in convincing her that the blockade was indeed effective. If it had been as leaky as the Confederates were claiming, then why make so much fuss?  Great Britain was perfectly happy to declare the Union blockade legal – the inconvenience to British trade was more than balanced by the invaluable precedent thus created.

The blockade of 1861 was indeed very leaky. Estimates suggest that only one in ten ships attempting to trade with the South was captured in the first year of the war. However, as the war progressed and the Union navy increased in size, the blockade became increasingly effective. By 1864 one in three ships were being captured, although even that ratio still left a good chance of profit for the owner of a blockade runner.

Despite claims to the contrary then and since, the blockade was effective. The number of ships entering southern ports was reduced by two thirds. Many of those ships were custom built blockade runners, capable of carrying much smaller cargos that their pre-war equivalents, so the actual amount of cargo carried must have been even smaller. The outgoing figures for cotton exports support this idea. In the three years before the war, ten million bales of cotton were exported from the south. In the three wartime years after the South lifted its own cotton embargo only half a million bales got out. While some of this was probably due to the disruption of the South's poor transport network and the capture by the Union of ports such as New Orleans, it does demonstrate the effectiveness of the blockade.

Of course the best way to close a Southern port was to capture it. The United States Navy retained command of the seas around the Confederacy, despite repeated Confederate efforts to break that control (see below for the battle of the Ironclads). This meant that the Union could launch attacks on any Southern port that was not protected by a major Confederate army.

At the start of the war, the Confederate states contained eight major ports capable of conducting a significant amount of trade. On the east coast were Norfolk, Wilmington, Charleston and Savannah and on the Gulf coast Pensacola, Mobile, New Orleans and Galveston.

You see something else here, Carthaginian, the "blockade" was only as effective as the cash and carry trade allowed it to be.

http://www.jcs-group.com/military/war1861fringe/running.html

Cargos on the inward trips were much more varied. The Confederate government desperately needed Europe's military equipment, lead for bullets and saltpeter for gunpowder, and engines, machinery and tools to strengthen munitions factories in the South.

Unfortunately for the Confederate military, blockade running firms quickly learned that bring ing in luxury goods was even more profitable. After all, one 2,500-pound cannon could be replaced with a lot of silk cloth, lace, perfumes, elegant furniture and French brandy, yielding the owners much higher returns than those earned by ferrying in munitions. Incoming merchandise was auctioned off at staggering prices. Between running in full of freight and getting out packed with cotton, one round trip could net a profit of more than $200,000.

As Alexander Stephens said of the Confederacy; "We cut our own throats on the altar of luxury."      

Oh... that French broadside ship would have been the least of anyone's worries in 1872.

I'd be far more afraid of the Taureau should I be coming into close proximity to the French coast,

I wouldn't. The Taureau carried two 240 mm fire ahead guns and was designed primarily to ram.

http://www.nytimes.com/1865/07/10/news/the-new-french-iron-clad.html

http://navalhistory.flixco.info/H/254210/8330/a0.htm

It was too slow tactically in a turn, its range too limited, and it could be easily dodged at gun range, as well as be pounded and sunk by the Armstrong or Dahlgren/Parrott guns using shot, then in service.   Versus New Ironsides, she is dead meat. Its ships like the Almas and the Oceans that should scare Federal cruisers and ironclads spitless.      

Ever hear of this?

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/at-kuk-kriegsmarine-lissa.htm

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Lissa_%281866%29

Lissa: Tegethoff got to replay Trafalgar in metal.

[Carthaginian]

If you'll read in your own quote:

Despite claims to the contrary then and since, the blockade was effective. The number of ships entering southern ports was reduced by two thirds. Many of those ships were custom built blockade runners, capable of carrying much smaller cargos that their pre-war equivalents, so the actual amount of cargo carried must have been even smaller. The outgoing figures for cotton exports support this idea. In the three years before the war, ten million bales of cotton were exported from the south. In the three wartime years after the South lifted its own cotton embargo only half a million bales got out. While some of this was probably due to the disruption of the South's poor transport network and the capture by the Union of ports such as New Orleans, it does demonstrate the effectiveness of the blockade.

The blockade ruined the South's economy... which was ONLY 'cash and carry'- they 'cashed' the cotton and 'carried' off the weapons.

[damocles]

If you'll read in your own quote:

Despite claims to the contrary then and since, the blockade was effective. The number of ships entering southern ports was reduced by two thirds. Many of those ships were custom built blockade runners, capable of carrying much smaller cargos that their pre-war equivalents, so the actual amount of cargo carried must have been even smaller. The outgoing figures for cotton exports support this idea. In the three years before the war, ten million bales of cotton were exported from the south. In the three wartime years after the South lifted its own cotton embargo only half a million bales got out. While some of this was probably due to the disruption of the South's poor transport network and the capture by the Union of ports such as New Orleans, it does demonstrate the effectiveness of the blockade.

The blockade ruined the South's economy... which was ONLY 'cash and carry'- they 'cashed' the cotton and 'carried' off the weapons.

500,000 tons of Cotton at 24 pence a pound? Buys a LOT of ammunition and ordnance.

http://www.civilwarhome.com/kingcotton.htm

They cut their own collective economic throats, but then that arrogant ruling class always did, didn't those slave-owners?

[Carthaginian]

They cut their own collective economic throats, but then that arrogant ruling class always did, didn't those slave-owners?

LOL... so, it all comes out in the wash. ::)
You really just want to bash the South because of a social institution which existed in the North for longer than it did in the South... if you notice, the Emancipation Proclamation only freed slaves in the 'States in rebellion' but did nothing to ease the plight of those in the slave states in Northern possession- OR, indeed, in New Orleans, which was under Union occupation by that time. :)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Emancipation_Proclamation.PNG
Blue areas allowed slavery by Lincoln's political maneuvering; the separate nation in red was 'denied' that right.

So, what we REALLY see in the 'Civil War' (the name itself is a nice propaganda piece, it was never a 'civil war' at all) is the difference between people who are not exactly pillars of morality and those who are deliberate hypocrites.

No further discussion forthcoming.

[damocles]

They cut their own collective economic throats, but then that arrogant ruling class always did, didn't those slave-owners?

LOL... so, it all comes out in the wash. ::)
You really just want to bash the South because of a social institution which existed in the North for longer than it did in the South... if you notice, the Emancipation Proclamation only freed slaves in the 'States in rebellion' but did nothing to ease the plight of those in the slave states in Northern possession- OR, indeed, in New Orleans, which was under Union occupation by that time. :)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Emancipation_Proclamation.PNG
Blue areas allowed slavery by Lincoln's political maneuvering; the separate nation in red was 'denied' that right.

So, what we REALLY see in the 'Civil War' (the name itself is a nice propaganda piece, it was never a 'civil war' at all) is the difference between people who are not exactly pillars of morality and those who are deliberate hypocrites.

No further discussion forthcoming.

Note the comment here, and agree to disagree, the Confederacy by all rights should have won. The stupidity and arrogance of their ruling class, that made it impossible for them to organize a rational national defense was what beat them.

That is the Confederate Lesson. Let your enemy beat himself. All you have to do is outlast him.

And sorry if you think my disgust with the Confederacy and the treason of the slave-owning class offends me seems to indicate a bias. It does, but not the one you think. The Southern "aristocracy" were composed of idiots and mental midgets.

I make up my opinions from facts and reasoning, and not to suit any body but myself. If people don't like my opinions, it makes little difference as I don't solicit their opinions or votes.

see also:

http://www.rjgeib.com/thoughts/sherman/sherman-to-burn-atlanta.html

William Tecumseh Sherman

[TexanCowboy]

And sorry if you think my disgust with the Confederacy and the treason of the slave-owning class offends me seems to indicate a bias. It does, but not the one you think. The Southern "aristocracy" were composed of idiots and mental midgets.

Really?!?!?...you know, there could, just maybe possibly, be people desended from what you call the "South aristocracy" on this site.

[ctwaterman]

Hmmmm.... Southern Aristocracy... Jefferson, Washington.... and dozens of others.   The Problem of Slavery was a hard economic problem to solve because by the time of the American Revolution most Southern Gentelmen were born into Genteel Poverty and died in Genteel Poverty still owing more then they started with.   

And then the Cotton Gin was invented and Rich Land could make you rich overnight in they year to 3 before you exhausted the land.

The Belief that the South Should have won the war is a very wierd belief, without the productive means to build their own Railways, Cannon, muskets, powder, or Ships and with less then half the population even less if you only count "White Population" for use in the Armed Forces then can someone tell me why the South should have won this war.... I think we should probably move this discussion out of The New Government in Holland section if we want to continue it.... ;D

[maddox]

People, could we do the Civil war in the meeting room?

I suggest we split off the "historical pages" to a new meeting room topic.

[ctwaterman]

People, could we do the Civil war in the meeting room?

I suggest we split off the "historical pages" to a new meeting room topic.

Agree

[damocles]

And sorry if you think my disgust with the Confederacy and the treason of the slave-owning class offends me seems to indicate a bias. It does, but not the one you think. The Southern "aristocracy" were composed of idiots and mental midgets.

Really?!?!?...you know, there could, just maybe possibly, be people desended from what you call the "South aristocracy" on this site.

We evolve culturally, TC. We improve. We put that nasty business behind us and improve our cultures, intellectual capacity, and morals. No slavery, no bigotry, no racism, no secession, no social Darwinism tolerated.  Call it progress. Anyway, this is the KoN news thread. I still scratch my head over how we got from the upcoming PW Mark III to Phil Sheridan and the Union blockade. I'm suggesting that the US Civil War be split off and moved to the meeting room. This is the last time here, unless the KoN invents a time machine and we start a time war.        

D.