Saved from the old board

Started by P3D, March 15, 2007, 12:44:22 PM

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P3D

Some knowledge data from the old forum, before van Owen goes berserk again. Will be formatted nicely later by me (and hopefully Borys).

Ammo hoists

After a bit google-fu I managed to get some snippets about ammo hoists.
1/ German KK(CL)s, had one hoist per gun (at least for 15cm guns. So CLs/PCs should have them. If the turrets/mounts have twin guns, definitely.

2/ Destroyers had one hoists (at least) for each group of guns, e.g. one for the forward and one for the aft mounts.


http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNGER_59-45_skc16.htm

QUOTE
Note:  In "Jutland:  An Analysis of the Fighting" by John Campbell, it is stated that German capital ships were provided with an ammunition hoist for each 15 cm (5.9") gun and that these could provide 7 or more complete rounds per minute.  For light cruisers the rate of supply was was about three to five rounds per minute per gun once the ready ammunition had been used up."


And from
http://www.gwpda.org/naval/w04usams.htm:

QUOTE

The ammunition-rooms of small ships are simply arranged in two groups in the hold, forward and aft. The regular type of hoists are used to convey ammunition to the main battery, while whips are generally used to hoist the boxes of secondary-battery ammunition through the hatches.

For the efficient use of a ship's battery in action, the supply of ammunition is next in importance to the correct use of the guns. The excellence of the gun-pointers and crews will avail nothing unless they can receive the ammunition in exactly the proper way.

Save for a few projectiles, it is unsafe to stow any ammunition near the guns; in fact, it is imperative to stow it below the water-line in certain places, which may be a long distance from some of the guns. The problem, then, which varies in its intricacy in each class of ships, is to maintain a supply of ammunition to each gun - firing several rounds per minute - as fast as it is needed, without allowing it to accumulate on deck, as, for instance, which the gun to which a particular chain of supply is silenced. All practicable precautions against powder-explosions from the enemy's fire must be enforced.

Obviously, the simplest and surest solution of the problem is to install a magazine and shell-room directly beneath each gun, which hoists leading upward to it. This would involve placing a line of magazines along each side of the ship, extending the whole length of the machinery-spaces, which cannot be done, because many rooms would be too near sources of heat, and the space is not available. These restrictions, which complicate the problem on board ship, do not affect the question of gun-installation on shore, where space and weight are unlimited.

This ideal arrangement of individual magazines and hoists is, in general, attained only for turret-guns, which, as it happens, are mounted over spaces available for magazines; the tendency, however, is to provide a hoist for each main-battery gun and a sufficient number for the smaller pieces. The hosts cannot lead very obliquely, and in some cases ammunition must be transported by hand over considerable distances, both below and on the battery decks; however, it is the best that can be done, and the difficulty exists in all navies.

Ammunition stowage and supply is a problem to which the designer devotes much thought; but when he has exhausted his ingenuity in the finished ship, the question of efficient supply is only partially solved, because the more important part is concerned with the personnel rather than with matériel. It remains for the "powder-division" (which contains many good men, and many not suitable for work at the guns) to manipulate the machinery of supply to the best advantage. The best thought of the officers in direct command is needed at this point, and complete success will come only when all the details have been minutely and patiently worked out. Care in stationing every man according to his fitness will often give good results from a manifestly imperfect system.


Don't know how should they be represented in SS. By one mount with hoists for and aft, the other just a deck mount? Suggestions?
   
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Borys    
Posted: Feb 21 2007, 05:37 PM


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Ahoj!
The feedback I'm getting in various places (most of which overlap with P3D's) would point to there being no hoists for destroyers and/or weapons up to 4 inch (or so).

On the other hand, hoists appear to the the norm for 6 inchers, even on such failures like the S-113.

In the case of destroyers hoists seem to appear with twin mounts and the move to 4,7 and 5 inch calibre.

Borys
   
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Borys    
Posted: Feb 21 2007, 06:30 PM


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Ahoj!
My convulted and twisted thinking process has led me to this:

In the pre-1920 era small ships did not have individual hoists for each gun. There were ready use magazines near each c.4 inch gun, refilled from a hoist connecting the magazine (if one) or magazines (two were used, on USN ships for instance) with the deck.

So I have come about to more or less P3Ds position (I'm slower on the uptake, it seems smile.gif) and to same question - how to represent it with SS?

Maybe:
105mm and smaller guns - if single - do not use "mount with hoist", but "deck mount". Anything larger and/or twinned has to use "mount with hoist"?

The one or two hoists to supply the 2 or 3 guns typically found on smaller vessels should not have weight meriting their inclusion.
However, "no hoist" = "problems with ammo supply in longer engagements" - something which a Player would have to consider at design stage.

For my GTBs I would not bother with hoists - they are torpedo delivery systems. My Scout Cruisers - these will get hoists for their 4 inchers, as they are more likely to fire for extended periods.

Borys




   
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Maddox    
Posted: Feb 22 2007, 02:22 AM


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I kept the practical issues in mind when simming out battles. Luckely enough, not many of the ships involved had mount and hoist yet.


You can have deck mounted guns as large as you please, but that means a very bad rate of fire, and a very small amount of ready ammo.
Or if I had to ask how big the ready ammo pile was, how big a bang it would have given when a fairly easy, non armored critical hit would have given.

Imagine a deck mounted 250mm gun, with 10 shells and enough propellant bags ,getting a hit of a 57mm QF gun.

A mount and hoist eliminates a lot of this issue, and the Turret and barbette effectively removes the chance of a critical hit without armor. The Habsburger battleship Tegethoff, controlled by Battle of the Pyramids then is the proof of that difference....
   
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P3D    
Posted: Feb 22 2007, 09:46 PM


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Another from Warships forum. Definite no.

QUOTE
I looked through British Destroyers by Edgar P. Marsh. Unfortunately, ammunition/shell hoists are not listed in the index. However, he does have drawings, some traced from Admiralty Sketch Designs and some copies of general arrangement plans. Some are highly detailed. Apparently, in the earliest destroyers shells and charges were literally "handed up" through hatches. Plate 17A shows the armament and ammunition flow for the 1912-13 destroyers ("L" class). They carried 3-4" guns and 2 twin tubes. There was a raised focsle. No 1 gun was on the focsle, No 2 was on a raised platform amidships (between the second and third funnels) on the main deck and No 3 was on the main deck aft. Magazines and shell rooms were at the bottom of the ship. The ammo flow for No 1 was by means of a continuous hoist from the magazine/shell room through a crew space on the second deck to another crew space on the main deck, then by a "Hand Up" hatch to the gun. The hatches in the top of the magazine and the top of the crew space on the main deck were vertically lined up. Ammo for No 2 came to the crew space on the main deck the same way and then was carried along the main deck past the two forward funnels to the gun. Ammo for No 3 gun was apparently handed from the magazine/shell room into the wardroom, and then through another "Hand Up" hatch to the gun. There is nothing to indicate there was any hoist for No 3 gun.

I also checked in Anatomy of the ship: The Destroyer Campbellton and looked at blueprints of flushdeckers from Floating Drydock. None showed anything about ammo handling. Alden's Flush Decks and Four Pipes doesn't mention it and neither does Campbell's Naval weapons of WW2. It may have been one of those things "everybody knew" so they didn't think they needed to explain it in detail.

The first indication of powered shell hoists (winches) is in the drawing of the Javelin class of 1936. It may have existed before, but isn't shown in the drawings.

WRT the original question, based on what I have found, I think man-powered hoists were in use by WWI when the ammo had to pass through more than two decks. If it was only one deck, I guess they just handed it along. Sort of explains why they carries so many "ready use" rounds.
The first purpose of a warship is to remain afloat. Anon.
Below 40 degrees, there is no law. Below 50 degrees, there is no God. sailor's maxim on weather in the Southern seas

P3D

 Ahoj!
http://p216.ezboard.com/fwarships1discussionboardsfrm1.showMessage?topicID=8063.topic

Interesting thread on shipping requeriments for troops. Discounting the "contribution" of Brad Smith III it is pleasant to read.

If one takes a Japanese 1940 Infantry Division (reinforced) used as benchmark in that thread as c.50% of our N-verse Infantry Corps, we need 500,000 tons for combat loading (packing is with easy access in mind) and 250,000 tons for ferry loading (packing is with space economy in mind). I'm guesstimating this out of:
QUOTE
A certain combat-loaded force of 43,000 men with 10,000 horses, 800 trucks, 90 days food, 120 day gas (garrison consumption rates) comes to 480,000 tons of shipping at .26 NRT/1 GRT. But if the same force is transport loaded (.4 to 1), has only 30 days gas, 60 days supply and is defending a static position (300 trucks and 2000 horses) then the lift needed drops to 211,000 tons, or only 44% of the first case.



I'm still trying to wrap my mind arond GRT and NRT, and exactly what tons are those mentioned above. A typical freighter in N-verse would be 4,000 or 5,000 of GRT.

So, if the relevant figures are in GRT, then it would be 25 freighters per corps for transport and 50 freighters per Infantry corps for assault.
Infantry corps, as I do not feel the urge to guesstimate this for a cavalry corps.

If there are major flaws in what I wrote, feel free to comment.

Borys

Posted by: Desertfox Feb 9 2007, 09:06 AM
Looks about right, I estimated I needed around 5+ ships to trasport a fully equiped Marine Brigade (5,000 troops) so for a full Corp I would need 50+.

Posted by: P3D Feb 9 2007, 12:46 PM
I always took 1GRT roughly as 1 displacement ton. My previous estimate was that you need 10000t of shipping to deliver 1000 troops with combat equipment, which still sounds about right, if you want to transport more than people.

I bet transfering three corps from both Austria and DKB to Brazil is using almost all the spare tonnage available, especially as you also have to supply them far from home. Anything larger would mean a great interruption of international trade, and would require at least a quarter's planning.

Unfortunately we do not have any figures about the merchant tonnage each country has, perhaps we should make some guesses?

Posted by: Borys Feb 9 2007, 01:06 PM
Ahoj!
I try to keep limitations in mind - that is why it took me half a year to get 2 Infantry and one Cavary corps across. And I made my life easier by buying part of the horses locally (also this in line with the story of horse shortage in Austria). Also, I hired passanger liners to ferry men with rifles across.
IIRC my merchant fleet is some 300 ships.
I will do some web trawling.

Borys

Posted by: P3D Feb 9 2007, 01:16 PM
Also, we should also know how many passenger liners we have. Especially large ones.

Posted by: Borys Feb 9 2007, 01:26 PM
Ahoj!
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics/staff/faculty/broadberry/wp/eurosector3.pdf

Near the end there's a table giving merchant marine sizes - in NRT - ARGHH!

OK - I will keep on checking. There is a site with passanger liners there ever were, I know that I ran across it when doing research for the Xantype class.

The Habsburgs hired 5 passanger liners for the Brasilian Crusade sealift - 4 unnamed ones and the s/s Chica Caliente.

ADDED LATER:
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/balance_of_power_in_1914.htm

Borys


Hm, by first guess is 1NRT equals 2 displacement tons.
So let's give out some tonnage (NRT) to the Navalism participants.
The 11000NRT the UK had is more than Navalism France would have.
Now, a Great Power with not too high reliance on overseas trade (e.g. AH) should have about 500. Nations with strong Naval tradition and coast should have double of this. Overseas colonies raise it again.
From that Warships topic, I'd say to transport a full corps, you'd need

100,000GRT/t of merchant shipping. Including the liners transporting the divisions.
If you are not transporting 15000 draft/riding horses with you, it decreases to 75,000.

For Cavalry, you need twice that, 200,000t for a corps.

Posted by: Ithekro Feb 9 2007, 07:03 PM
Just a point, the United States, prior to its Civil War probably had one of the largest Merchant Marines in the World. During that war they lost or used a lot of shipping, and thus were not able to recover until probably the Great War, or maybe even the Second World War.

The Essaylean and other commerce empires might be seen as an extreme Venice perhaps. In these cases they might not have colonies, but more or less control ports to the point where they don't need colonies, the locals need them to survive. The Essaylean could also be considered the French Merchant Fleet. Perhaps the French outsourced before it was fashionable.

Just making points. It could mean nothing. All I know is that it took Rohan about a year to muster its forces for the heavy counter-attacks and invasions during the Anahuac War.

Posted by: Borys Feb 9 2007, 07:05 PM
Ahoj!
I think we seem to agree. 100K BRT, if we assume 4 or 5K BRT freighters, comes to about 20-25 ships. This is transport loading.
Combat loading is twice that.

How about:
Infantry Corps:
transport load
- garrison, cannot depart point of disembarking - 75K BRT
- normal - 100K BRT

combat load
- garrison, cannot depart point of disembarking - 150K BRT
- normal - 200 BRT

Cavalry corps:
transport load
- 200K BRT

combat load
- 300 BRT

However, I would leave out the garisson modes, as I'm afraid that some players will immediately forgoe horse draft and claim to use their grunts for pulling wagons and guns.

Borys

Posted by: Borys Feb 9 2007, 07:09 PM
Ahoj!
I was not around when the N-verse was designed, but the way Ithekro described the Essayleans is more or less how I pictured them. Like I said, this is the feeling I got from the encyclopaedia. A naval power, no matter where you turn, you find an Essaylean ship. And you don't mess around with Essaylean ships, as that brings Celtic wrath on you.

Borys

Posted by: Desertfox Feb 9 2007, 07:20 PM
Its too low for NS. NS might not have much of a navy but it is THE Merchant power.

Excluding France, ACM was #1 then NS considered itself #2. So giving ACM say 4000K BRT, would give NS 3000K BRT. After the fall of the ACM, NS picked some of the pieces. Say 1000k. NS did not really lose much during the war. Loses to Austria where replaced by Treaty, Spain disintergrated too fast and only had two raiders. And China couldnt intercept anything other than coastal traffic. Also all of the Merchant marine fled to Hawaii after the break up. So I say NS has around 4000k BRT.

Half of the French merchant fleet got divided between Holland and Essaylean.
Columbian figures include IC ships. Austria was revised due to their four troop transports that I neglected before.
Figures in thousands of GRT/standard displacement tonnage (multiplied by 0.6 to get NRT).

Europe
HOL 7000(4200)
Essaylean 5000(3000)
FRA 5000(3000)
Baltic 5000(3000)

Russia (800)500
AH 1000(600)
Italy 1250(750)
Spain 400(250)
Aragon 400(250)
Portugal 170(100)
ACM remains 2500(1500)

Americas
GC 1000 (600)
UKA 1800 (1100)
Rohan 3300(2000)
CSA 2500 (1500)
USA 1700 (1000)

Africa+Asia
Orange 1700(1000)
USNS 1250(750)
PDNS 2100(1250)
DKB 3300(2000)
Turkey 400(250)
Siam 170(100)
China 400(250)
EK 100(60)

To transport a corps with full equipment, it takes 100,000t. That assumes smaller, slower (12-16kts) ships. If large, fast liners are used, this figure is increased somewhat. 75000t to transport only men and supplies. 200,000t to transport a cavalry division. For combat/assault loading, you need double the amount.

Posted by: Earl822 Feb 16 2007, 12:39 PM
UKA would have a stronger Merchant Marine

Posted by: Desertfox Feb 16 2007, 12:51 PM
The USNS rules the seaways, there is no way the PDRoS with 3 CBs and not much else would be able to control the Merchant Marine. NS should at theminimum be the equal of the DKB.

The Baltic Confederacy methinks has too much.

Posted by: P3D Feb 16 2007, 01:02 PM
Why? UKA has no overseas colonies. It has about as much as Orange for about the same industrial output. It has less than CSA as CSA does have traffic around Cape Horn, and a bit longer coastline. It is not a trading empire with colonies all over the world either (like NS, DKB, Holland or Essaylean). And the sum of the North American states is two-and-half the historical US merchant Marine.

I can start again, with assuming a total world merchant marine, then distributing different weights to each country, and then come up with new numbers, whic IMO won't be much different than we have now.

Posted by: P3D Feb 16 2007, 01:27 PM
This distribution of Merchant Marine means the following:

IN Atlantic trade the largest player is the Essaylean Empire, but does not dominate over the merchant marine of other Atlantic powers. Intra-Pacific and Indian Ocean trade is mainly by the DKB, and the NS. Trade between Europe and Asia is mainly by French, Holland and Baltic ships.

Posted by: Earl822 Feb 16 2007, 02:33 PM
The UKA relies on the trade from Europe.

Posted by: P3D Feb 16 2007, 02:47 PM
QUOTE (Earl822 @ Feb 16 2007, 11:33 AM)
The UKA relies on the trade from Europe.

Whis is partly done by UKA merchants partly by Essaylean and Baltic ships. 1000NRT is enough for that, it is the same size as the OTL French merchant fleet in WWI.

Posted by: Phoenix Feb 17 2007, 02:01 PM
The Middle Kingdom has no merchant fleet to speak of and I guess the number in the list should be correct for my nation. Trade is mainly through the DKB (in Wuhan), a bit with others in Hong Kong, Macau and Shanghai, and with the Russian enclave in Port Arthur. We will start trade with the French in Viet Namh. And then there are border towns where stuff happens and will happen. Trade overseas is mainly shipped with foreign merchants, although the Middle Kingdom has junks of their own. But these junks usually cater to Middle Kingdom ports and rarely venture over the oceans. My nation is still isolationist and that tends to keep the merchant fleet numbers on the low side.
Logic.

Posted by: Borys Feb 18 2007, 07:20 PM
Ahoj!
The last time around my merchant marine got too much tonnage. The four "progressive women" class troop transports have under 100,000 tons displacement, with some 32-35,000 tons miscalenous weight between them. Or is BRT and NRT still beyind my perception skills?

Borys

Posted by: P3D Feb 18 2007, 07:26 PM
Well, indeed, I gave you 100k NRT instead of 60k...

Other thing.
Merchant marine should increase by time. Say, (HBP+MBP/2)x1000t every new year. The rest of the cililian shipbuilding capacity should ho to replacing old vessels.
The first purpose of a warship is to remain afloat. Anon.
Below 40 degrees, there is no law. Below 50 degrees, there is no God. sailor's maxim on weather in the Southern seas

P3D

Building Airships.

Non military capable airships don't count towards the military budgets. If such airships are used for war, they are very vurnable and won't have any positive effect on that war.

Militarized airships do count into the upkeep budget, and the conversion follows the pricetag and disadvantages of AMC conversions from freighters.

Military Airships are divided into 5 types, sorted for size, as this is also mostely dependent on historical build era.
Type 1 Volume: 20 000m³ and 4 tons military payload over 700 nm speed 40 kts
Type 2 Volume: 40 000m³ and 9 tons military payload over 1200 nm speed 50 kts
Type 3 Volume: 70 000m³ and 16 tons military payload over 2200 nm speed 60 kts
Type 4 Volume: 130 000m³ and 31 tons military payload over 3900 nm speed 65 kts
Type 5 Volume: 210 000m² and 60 tons military payload over 5200 nm speed 70 kts

Blimps will be limited to type 2, and Semi rigids to type 3

As in warships. Exchanging speed or load for range or visa versa is possible

Building and maintaining airships

Construction ,maintenance and safe storage happens in hangars. Landed airships are vurnable to the weather, so they have to be stored in these huge structures if they are not in use. The minimum is a 3 to 2 ratio. 3 airships to 2 hangars.
If less hangars are constructed, 1 or more airships, according to the mathematic ratio will be subject to a wear and tear ratio equal to the ratio applicated to warships. With the following provision, Airships below 50% can't fly. Controled landing Yes, keeping aloft, no.

Hangar cost
Type 0 cost 5 MBP
Type 1 cost 10 MBP
Type 2 cost 15 MBP
Type 3 cost 20 MBP
Type 4 cost 35 MBP
Type 5 cost 40 MBP

Build cost. Every 20 000 m³ of military airship is 1MBP

Refits and rebuilds.

Airships, due their very light build need refits a lot faster than warships.
Every 3 years of normal use will see the need for a refit.
Cost, 1/4th of the newly build aiship
After 2 refits these giants of the air are so outdated that they are no longer seen as a first grade military airship, and should be delegated to secondary roles.

Rebuilds , due the fast changing technology in this field of military science a full rebuild would be more expensive than scrapping and building a new airship.
A rebuild, increases the usefull life with again 2 refits, giving it a total lifetime of 18 years.
But the pricetag is prohibitive at 66% of a new airship.

Reconstruction. No know reconstructions- the R101 reconstructed even new- can be called a succes in OTL. There is no direct reason to assume this is different in the N-verse.

Damage.

100-86% Normal working aspects in airships. Doesn't affect any of the capabilities, unless it is visual. This is payed for in the upkeep

80-66% range/speed/lifting capacity is reduced due leaks in the gasbags, lost , men, balast or fuel.

To repair this, the airship needs an input of 10% of the basic cost.

65-50% barely airworthy, capacity lost in range/speed/lift is such that the nearest landing spot under controled circumstances is needed.

A full refit is needed to repair this ship. 1/4 of the HBP of a new ship. This is a repair, and doesn't count into the refits that are needed every 3 years.

50-35% A controled hard landing is the only option, but further damage can be avoided. Unless the the bad luck dice says otherwise. Hydrogen is still flamable.

If the airship survives this crash, not even a refit can't restore it to it's original state. A reconstruction is possible, if the large lumbering hulk can be put into a hangar.

Below 35%, crash and burn baby. Icarus was the first human to fly, but he isn't the last.
Maybe the crew survives.

Upkeep. 5% per year, as armies and naval ships.
The first purpose of a warship is to remain afloat. Anon.
Below 40 degrees, there is no law. Below 50 degrees, there is no God. sailor's maxim on weather in the Southern seas

P3D

Ahoj!
http://p216.ezboard.com/fwarships1discussi...icID=8118.topic
IMO worth reading, as they put our armament and equipment in perspective. And shed light on what is POSSIBLE with what we have.

New Golconda's posts seem to be of most value.

Borys

Ahoj!
Here are the memoirs of Admiral Scheer.
http://www.richthofen.com/scheer/
He very much wanted to integrate U-Bots and Zeppelins into the operations of the Hoch See Flotte. Rarely with success.

BTW - at Skagerrak/Jutland the Grand Fleet had a seaplane tender with it. But it never slowed down to launch any planes.

Borys
The first purpose of a warship is to remain afloat. Anon.
Below 40 degrees, there is no law. Below 50 degrees, there is no God. sailor's maxim on weather in the Southern seas

P3D

 Found some interesting stuff on the IRL undersea telegraph cables.

http://www.atlantic-cable.com/Cables/CableTimeLine/index.htm

Click on the pic for larger map of the 1901 network.

user posted image

By Wikipedia, the signal speed was 120 words a minute in the transatlantic cable (I don't know for how many cables), quite a jump from the 1868 capacity of only 8 words per minute.

What would be the extent of the telegraph network in N-verse? The 1864 wire needed a cabble weight of 1000kg/km, and half it was copper. A 10000km wire should have the cost of several battleships. In comparison, 1901 world copper production was 500 000t.
   
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Borys    
Posted: Sep 27 2006, 04:26 PM


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Ahoj!
You showed only one company's cables. IMO these two maps are more telling:
http://atlantic-cable.com/Maps/BrightMap.jpg
and
http://atlantic-cable.com/Maps/1924SchreinerMap.jpg

Borys
   
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P3D    
Posted: Sep 27 2006, 04:51 PM


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AS I understand the legend, only the red lines belong to the Eastern Telegraph Co, all the black lines are the other (non-British) operators. And it is consistent with the other maps.

I made some corrections to my previous post, links corrected.
   
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Borys    
Posted: Sep 27 2006, 05:06 PM


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Ahoj!
You are indeed correct, sir.
Me stupid.

Borys
   
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Maddox    
Posted: Sep 27 2006, 06:18 PM


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QUOTE
The cable consisted of seven copper wires, each weighing 26 kg/km (107 pounds per nautical mile), covered with three coats of gutta-percha, weighing 64 kg/km (261 pounds/nautical mile) and wound with tarred hemp, over which a sheath of eighteen strands, each of seven iron wires, was laid in a close spiral. It weighed nearly 550 kg/km (1.1 ton per nautical mile), was relatively flexible and able to withstand a pull of several 10's of kN (several tons). It was made jointly by two English firms — Glass, Elliot & Co., of Greenwich, and R. S. Newall & Co., of Liverpool.


25*26= 650 kg/km meaning, for 10 000 km you have a cable containing 6500 tons copper.
Compared to the yearly production of 500 000 tons that is acceptable.
Even with a 50 strand cable- if the technology allows- meaning a thinner copper or copper-silver alloy- I don't see the weight of copper rise above 10000 tons per 10 000 km.
Just 2 battleships for a cable around the equator. biggrin.gif Or 1.5 French monstrosities.
   
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P3D    
Posted: Sep 27 2006, 07:18 PM


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I'd assume copper costs a bit more than armor steel. Especially high-purity oxygen-free copper, which needs electrolytic refinement. BTW Copper-Silver alloys have worse resistance than pure copper (nonuniform lattice just increases resistance, 75%Silver-25% copper has 10% higher resistance than pure copper)
Armor steel contains 3-4% Nickel (the most expensive constituent) which costs, say 5x as much as copper. I'd say of copper should cost about 3-5x as much as armor steel. Affordable quantity, yes, but hardly a trivial amount.

I am sure there's something on the bed on the cost of the cables (expressed in pounds raised for construction) to compare it to battleship costs.

Of course, it is only on the sidelines, but i find the capabilities of 1850-1900's-era technology fascinating.
   
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Maddox    
Posted: Sep 27 2006, 09:08 PM


Hegemon
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P3D ,if your guessing about the costprice of copper compared to alloyed steel, you're not far off. 1 kg normal electrical copper is +/- 4 times more expensive as type 304 stainless steel.
Now, this varies between suppliers, and amounts. But that's the market for you.

On older technologies, especialy metalworking I do have a bit of experience, and in the forseeable future even more, as we're planning to build a classic forge at home.
(And also an high tech Titanium and stainless steel electroforge -under argon atmosphere )
   
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P3D    
Posted: Sep 27 2006, 11:30 PM


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[ooc]
That's quite a machine shop, what do you want to make from titanium at home?

I cannot be too far off, we are using a lot of high-T stuff in our lab (Nickel, Hastelloy, Mo, W) - especially after I looked up raw material prices on the net wink.gif. But armor steel has much less nickel and chromium in it than stainless steel - it rather have less, as Stainless Steel does not really like seawater.

Problem is trying to estimate cost in 1903 from today's volatile commodity prices.
   
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Maddox    
Posted: Sep 28 2006, 12:40 AM


Hegemon
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The easiest to find armouring metals are certain low alloy steels, or high grade aluminium alloys.
I could trow the type or manufactorers numbers around ,but that's for PM's I dare to say. It won't contribute to the forum.


In effect, copper is expensive because the purification methode uses loads of power and time. Working pure copper is a breeze compared to steel, so, the wire making is not the big issue.

Armor plate uses exactly the same.... Main difference, the main component of "N-verse" armor, iron, is rather easy to make, compared to other metals. But the finishing of the products is rather tough.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

But for our purposes, there is enough copper to go around to build a simular Sub -Oceanic telegraph network.

If somebody feels him or herself called to work the N-verse wire? Bonusses to be earned....



P3D, ever seen Battlebots on TV? Or in real Life? I build machines that can participate in that, and survive.
   
Top
Borys    
Posted: Sep 28 2006, 03:28 AM


Unregistered









   
Ahoj!
Copper:
1 - I read, online (lost the link), the findings of US military technology investigation groups in Japan in 1946. The Japanese managed to replace part of the Nikel in armor plates with copper, apparently with no loss in effectiveness;

2 - in N-verse more copper will soon come on the market, after the re-opening of the north Luzon mines at Mankayan

3 - even more copper will come on the market when the technology for extraction of the metal from porphyry deposits will spread

Borys
   








   
There be copper in them thar hills in Zambia too. Historically not mined until the 1930s historically, but you never know...
The first purpose of a warship is to remain afloat. Anon.
Below 40 degrees, there is no law. Below 50 degrees, there is no God. sailor's maxim on weather in the Southern seas

P3D

The Ministere de la Defense published the drawings of all warship classes launched between 1890 and 1950.

http://www.servicehistorique.sga.defense.g...o/listebato.php

P3D

http://www.gwpda.org/naval/pdredmdg.htm

Pre-Dreadnought Medium Armament

This essay appears courtesy of Keith Allen (KEACLA1@aol.com).

Some have made the suggestion that the development of fire control systems was driven largely by the advent of medium-caliber quick-firing guns, which unlike heavy guns could be used at long range and with sufficient rate of fire to make spotting corrections practical. I questioned this correlation of quick-firers or medium guns to long-range engagement. I have taken a further look at the development of secondary batteries in predreadnought battleships, mainly in the U.S. and British navies; no disrespect is intended to the French, Italians, Germans, or the Russians, but most of my sources in this period are on the British and Americans.

There were four fairly distinct categories of guns on predreadnoughts

* 1) heavy main-battery guns, usually 12-inch but sometimes 13- or 13..5-inch;
* 2) intermediate bag-loaded guns, such as the U.S. 8-inch and British 9.2-inch; these were characteristic mainly of the late predreadnought era;
* 3) medium guns, typically 6-inch and usually quick-firers; 6-inchers early in the predreadnought era, however, were bag-loaded rather than quick-firing;
* 4) light anti-torpedo batteries, such as 3-inch or 12-pdr. guns.

To define two basic terms before starting: A quick-firing (QF) or, in USN terms, a rapid-firing (RF) gun has a quick-acting breech mechanism and a metal cartridge case. The British term "BL," which initially meant breech-loader and in official terminology retained this meaning, subsequently came in reality to mean--and is used here to mean--a bag-loaded gun, as opposed to a QF gun.
British Battleship Secondary Armament, 1870-1902

While WARRIOR and her immediate successors had mixed batteries, by the early 1870s British battleships were built with single-caliber batteries; e.g. DEVASTATION, THUNDERER, and DREADNOUGHT, all laid down 1869-1870, had four 12-inch guns and no secondary battery as completed. The first mention I can find in Oscar Parkes's book of an anti-torpedo battery is in TEMERAIRE, laid down in 1873; unfortunately Parkes does not make a fuss about it or describe the origins of this battery. The giant INFLEXIBLE, laid down shortly afterward, had a battery of six 20 pdrs. which Parkes says were meant both for torpedo defense and as saluting guns.

The first medium-caliber guns in British battleships were fitted in AJAX and AGAMEMNON (both laid down 1876 and completed in 1883). These were equipped with two 6-inch bag-loaded (BL) guns, intended for use against the unarmored portions of enemy ships. In addition these ships had a light anti-torpedo battery, at least some of which was composed of 6 pdr Nordenfelt QF guns. In the space of a decade then, we have gone from a single-caliber to a three-tiered armament in British battleships.

In 1876 the Italians laid down their innovative ITALIA, with a raft-body construction and unarmored except for the redoubt housing the heavy guns. Her designer, Benedetto Brin, believed that no armor could protect a ship against heavy guns. ITALIA also had an unusually large secondary battery; she was designed with eighteen 6-inch, later changed to seven 5.9-inch and four 4.7-inch. Although these were apparently not quick-firers in the strict sense, they ironically foreshadowed the development of the fast-firing medium guns that would make Brin's own design obsolete, as an unarmored ship could be riddled to pieces by QF guns.

This implication of ITALIA's armament was recognized by British designers, and Parkes sees it as highly influential in the design of COLLINGWOOD, precursor to the "Admiral" class. "The prospect of having to face a heavy volume of fire from a numerous battery of secondary guns such as had been introduced in the ITALIA opened up entirely new problems in the matter of protection. These 6-in. B.L. [i.e. the 5.9 BLs on ITALIA] could not be used when the big guns were in action [presumably because of blast], and could only play their part against capital ships when the range had been closed. This meant that instead of concentrating armour to meet a very slow and uncertain fire at long range by big guns only, it had become necessary to devise a method of distribution" designed to ensure protection against heavy, medium, and light guns. [Parkes, pp. 299-300]

COLLINGWOOD (laid down 1880, completed 1887) introduced the 6-inch secondary battery in British battleships. These were still bag-loaded, not quick-firers. John Roberts says in "Conway's" that they were intended both for torpedo defense and for use against the unarmored portions of heavy ships; D.K. Brown, in "Warrior to Dreadnought" (p. 92) clearly states that the 6-inchers were for use against battleships, while torpedo defense was the mission of the 6-pdr and 3-pdr guns.

Parkes writes that the torpedo menace loomed very large in battleship design by the mid-1880s, and that the development of larger quick-firers was seen as a necessary counter to it. The first medium-caliber quick-firers in British battleships were fitted in NILE and TRAFALGAR (laid down 1886, completed 1890-1891). With their six 4.7-inch guns, "the torpedo menace began to assume its proper proportions" (p. 345). In the important ROYAL SOVEREIGN class of the 1889 program, the British advanced to a secondary armament of ten 6-inch quick-firers, along with sixteen 6-pdr and twelve 3-pdr.

D.K. Brown's interpretation of this QF armament differs substantially from that of Oscar Parkes. The 6-inch QF on ROYAL SOVEREIGN "was not an anti-destroyer weapon as in later Dreadnoughts but was intended to destroy the unarmoured structure of battleships" (p. 129). Subsequently he reiterates this point in saying of British battleship armament in 1893-1904 that "the secondary battery, usually twelve 6in, was intended to attack the unarmoured portion of enemy ships; 12pdrs and smaller were mounted to protect against torpedo boats. Many officers believed that the enemy would be disabled by such a 'hail of fire' and only then would the 12in guns fire, sinking the opponent with AP shots at close range" [p. 154].

This is the one statement I can find in support of the notion that the heavy guns were envisaged mainly for a close-range coup de grace, although it does not necessarily imply that the quick-firers were used at long range. Elsewhere Brown indicates that there was no difference in the ranges envisaged for 6-inch and 12-inch guns: "Prior to DREADNOUGHT the fighting range was about 3000 yds at which both the 6in and 12in could hit frequently. The generally-accepted view was that the enemy should be disabled by a hail of 6in fire, using HE shells and then sunk by AP shells from the 12in. The 6in 'secondary' armament was an important (to some the most important) weapon in fighting enemy battleships. Lesser guns, 12 pdr and and below, were provided to deal with torpedo boats."

The suggestion that medium-caliber, quick-firing guns were more amenable to spotting corrections than large guns, because in the case of the latter the target would move too far in the interval between shots for such adjustments to be effective. Brown actually takes precisely the opposite view. "As range increased, it became necessary to spot the fall of shot before firing the next round to correct range and deflection. It was this, more than anything, which led to the immense superiority of the big gun. The smaller gun, whose apparent advantage was in rate of fire, could not achieve this rate at longer range." Later he explains this more fully: "...the splashes from the 6in secondary armament merely obscured the more important splashes from the 12in. The need to spot the fall of shot and apply corrections before the next salvo meant that the effective rate of fire of a 6in at 6000yds was much less than that achieved in short-range target practice; in fact, as range increased, the rate of hitting by the 12in exceeded that from the 6 inch" [pp. 180-81].
U.S. Battleship Intermediate And Medium Armament

Norman Friedman, in his discussion of predreadnought armament in "U.S. Battleships," regards both the heavy and medium batteries of the day as essentially short-range weapons: "The mixed-calibre battleship designs of the turn of the century were quite logical, given slowly firing heavy guns whose limited accuracy demanded short battle ranges, RF guns that fired HE shells, and machine guns and machine cannon that were effective at the then-prevailing short battle ranges. The heaviest guns would try for hits of individually devastating effect on belt or on main battery. The lighter weapons would attack area targets, those less well- protected areas vulnerable only to great numbers of hits" [pp. 12-13].

U.S. battleship armament of the 1890s differed substantially from that of Britain and most other powers in the presence of an intermediate 8-inch battery, well before comparable guns became standard on European battleships. The first two U.S. battleships, MAINE and TEXAS (laid down 1888-1889, commissioned 1895), had 6-inch BL secondary batteries. But 8-inch guns were introduced in the subsequent INDIANA class (laid down 1891, commissioned 1895-1896) and became standard after that. The basic reason for this choice, Friedman believes, is that the United States could not yet manufacture the 6-inch QF guns that were installed in contemporary British battleships. The 8-inch gun could be used instead, to puncture the armor designed to defend against 6-inch fire. "This was not a happy choice. Eight-inch guns were heavy and cumbersome," and their rate of fire was not impressive--about one round every two minutes (see notes on rate of fire at the end of this tome). [pp. 12-13, 26-27]

After the INDIANAs, the one-of-a-kind IOWA and the KEARSARGE class were built with 8- inch guns--KEARSARGE and KENTUCKY with their peculiar arrangement of 8-inchers superimposed on the 13-inch turrets. By 1896, however, the U.S. Navy finally had developed a 6-inch QF gun, and decided to install it in place of the 8-inchers on the ILLINOIS class. The Bureau of Ordnance believed that the 6-inch would have a rate of fire three to five times greater than that of the heavier gun. The ILLINOIS and subsequent MAINE class had a secondary battery of 6-inch QF guns, and no eight-inchers.

While these ships were under construction, however, the Battle of Santiago restored the luster of the eight-inch gun. The 13-inch did not do well, nor did the 6-inch, although as Friedman notes the 6-inchers in the battle were of the old slow-firing type. The 8-inch guns were restored in the next class, the VIRGINIAs, which had four calibers of guns: 12-inch, 8-inch, 6-inch QF, and a 3- inch anti-destroyer battery. The stated rationale for the 8-inch guns was that it "was superior to the 6 inch because it could penetrate the 6-inch armor that shielded the secondary batteries of foreign battleships." The VIRGINIAs, like KEARSARGE, had the 8-inchers superimposed over the main battery, so that there was gross interference between the two. Furthermore, the 8- inchers apparently did not provide a sufficiently rapid fire to justify their existence. Friedman quotes a former CO of VIRGINIA as saying that "the great increase in the rapidity of fire of our heavy guns from, say, one shot in three minutes to three shots in one minute, virtually neutralized the advantage of having 8-inch guns," which constantly interfered with the big guns. The rate of fire of the 12-inch guns was surprisingly high, if this is accurate--faster than the 16-inch guns of a World War II battleship, which could get off about two rounds per minute. [Friedman, 4 1-43]

In its final two predreadnought types, the CONNECTICUT class and the small MISSISSIPPI and IDAHO, the U.S. Navy fitted an odd combination of 8-inch and 7-inch guns, dispensing with the 6-inch QF. "The board justified its retention of the 8-inch gun as necessary to pierce the medium armor which covered much of the upperworks of contemporary battleships. It considered the 7 inch the best possible rapid-fire weapon, capable of penetrating 7 inches of armor at 3,000 yards, that is, at battle range." The 7-inch was not actually a quick-firer in the strict sense, however.

Friedman's account suggests that the intermediate guns, like the 6-inchers, were not suited for long-range fire. In deliberations in 1903, leading eventually to the dreadnought, the Naval War College Staff noted that the torpedo danger would force ships to engage at 3,000 yards or more, and that at that range the 8-inch and 7-inch guns could not penetrate the armor covering the enemy's secondary battery--a major target of medium and intermediate guns. The destruction of enemy battleships required heavy guns; defense against torpedo attack required lighter, rapid-fire guns. The intermediate battery was not well suited to either role. [p. 53]
Intermediate Guns and the Last British Predreadnoughts

The United States Navy, as noted, adopted the intermediate battleship gun well before other nations, and after briefly abandoning it had restored the 8-inch gun by the turn of the century. At about this time, the intermediate gun made its appearance in British and other foreign battleships. The eight-ship KING EDWARD VII class (laid down 1902-1904, completed 1905-1906) had an intermediate battery of four 9.2-inch guns, along with ten 6-inch QF and 12-pdr and 3-pdr anti- torpedo batteries. British authors attribute the installation of the 9.2 to the example of NEW JERSEY (VIRGINIA class) and the Italian BENEDETTO BRIN. Oscar Parkes says that the 9.2 fired almost as quickly as the 6-inch, although some other figures contradict this (see next section). Improvements in armor and increases in battle range had made the 6-inch less effective. Most Royal Navy officers greatly favored the 9.2-inch, and believed the 6-inch to be superfluous in these ships. [Parkes, p. 427; Richard Burt, "British Battleships 1889-1904," pp. 229-38; unfortunately D.K. Brown doesn't say much about the advent of the 9.2, as best I can tell.]

In the final predreadnought class, LORD NELSON and AGAMEMNON, the 6-inch guns were eliminated, and the 9.2s increased to ten guns. The combination of 12-inch and 9.2-inch proved unhappy in practice, however, as it was virtually impossible to distinguish their splashes.

The trend toward intermediate battleship guns, begun in the United States and Italy, was copied in several navies besides the British. Russian battleships for some time had had a secondary armament of 6in/45s. In the EVSTAFI and IMPERATOR PAVEL classes, laid down in 1903-1904, the Russians adopted an 8in/50 intermediate battery. The Germans went from 150mm to 170mm in the seconary battery of their last predreadnoughts. The French increased their secondary battery from 6.4-inch to 7.6-inch in the LIBERTE class, laid down in 1902-1903.
A Note on Rates of Fire

Friedman provides rates of fire for some U.S. battleship guns in "US Naval Weapons," p. 17. He notes that while quick-firing guns brought a great increase in rate of fire, subsequent improvements in training and materiel also substantially improved the rate of fire of bag guns; one such step was the adoption of smokeless powder, which did not leave the extensive residue deposited by black powder, which required the bore to be cleaned after every round. Figures for 1897 and 1907 are:
Gun 1897 1907
6in/40 BL one round every 90 seconds one round every 8.2 seconds
6in/40 RF one round every 40 seconds one round every 7.9 seconds
8in/35 one round every two minutes two rounds per minute
12in/35 one round every five minutes one round every 51 seconds (that one round per 20 seconds claimed by the VIRGINIA's captain did seem a little optimistic).

Friedman notes in reference to the 6-inch that by 1907 the gap between BL and RF rates of fire had narrowed greatly. Note, though, that the intermediate 8-inch gun still had a low rate of fire.

D.K. Brown (p. 156) quotes Jellicoe's 1906 figures for rates of fire in gunlayers' tests and in battle practice, and notes that the latter figures corresponded well to those actually attained by the Japanese at Tsushima:
Gun Gunlayers Battle Practice
6-inch 12 rounds per minute 4 rounds per minute
9.2-inch 5 rounds per minute 2 rounds per minute
12-inch 2 rounds per minute one round per minute

Note again that the rate of fire of the intermediate gun is not dramatically better than for the heavy gun.
Conclusions

A review of the data does not support my initial belief that the big guns of predreadnoughts were meant for relatively long ranges; nor do my sources support the theory that medium or intermediate-caliber guns were intended for action at longer ranges than the heavy guns, although perhaps Russian or other sources would present a different picture. It would appear that the heavy and intermediate guns of the late predreadnought era were intended for action at similar ranges, about 3,000 yards, and that in practice the rate of fire of the 8-inch or 9.2-inch gun was not sufficient to riddle the upperworks of an enemy with rapid fire; these guns were a compromise, and probably not a very good one, between the heavy, slow-firing 12-inch gun and the rapid-fire 6-incher. The 6-inch quick-firers were originally intended primarily to shred the upperworks of enemy heavy ships, not to counter enemy torpedo boats as I had suggested. But these medium batteries lost their effectiveness in this role as ranges increased, and by the early dreadnought era these weapons had become primarily anti-destroyer guns.
Last Updated: 12 July, 1999.

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The first purpose of a warship is to remain afloat. Anon.
Below 40 degrees, there is no law. Below 50 degrees, there is no God. sailor's maxim on weather in the Southern seas

P3D

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Navalism > The Meeting Rooms > The Beleriand Canal


Posted by: Desertfox Jan 7 2006, 09:51 PM
Specs

Total Cost: 200 Million Dollars

Cost in Build Points: 35 LBPs, 5 MBPs (the MBPs are for locks and such)

Beginning date: Q3/1901

Finishing date: 1908

Shares: 1-2 per country at 5 Million Dollars/1 LBP per share.

Let the arguments begin!

Posted by: Ithekro Jan 7 2006, 11:12 PM
It looks like Ammon-In-Gelydh (San Jaun del Sur) will become a fairly important place once this canal is finished. Might need to build a base on the other coast, or else just have that part of the Eglarest (Bluefields) patrol area.


Rough Estimate of the Beleriand Canal 1901

http://z4.invisionfree.com/Navalism/index.php?act=Attach&type=post&id=3175128

Posted by: The Rock Doctor Jan 8 2006, 02:22 PM
That's one way of doing things.

I've assumed that the Darien Canal, which is essentially identical to the historical Panama Canal, is a civilian...well, non-military...venture, and thus not paid for out of my factories and manpower. I've just set up a less ambitious timetable than was historically the case, and will be roleplaying out the expense and workforce issues.

Ownership is an interesting issue, and I'd be intrigued to see how prospective shareholders in the canal co-exist when some of them have poor diplomatic relations at best. Gran Colombia will simply retain complete ownership of its own canal, and will charge modest fees for passage rights in order to recoup its expenses.

I'm also interested to see how the possible New Swiss-French conflict is going to affect the New Beleriand Canal in terms of control, construction, and so forth.

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v514/ithekro/NewBeleriand1a.jpg

Posted by: Ithekro Jan 8 2006, 02:43 PM
Well there are hopes such a conflict does not begin. Should the situation spiral out of control, ownership of the Canal zone reverts to the nation that has leased the land...in this case Rohan. The French Canal is a touchier issue, as the nation that leased that land does not hold the region anymore, nor does its government exist (at least officially). In theory that land would also revert to Rohan as part of New Rhun.

Rohan would likely continue the New Beleriand project should the situation between the New Swiss and French get out of hand. A direct route between one coast and another in New Beleriand is much better militarily than going around the Horn, and slightly better than paying fees to go though the Darien Canal. The Darien Canal has the possibility of being closed to Rohan, which from an economic and military standpoint is unacceptable. The two canals might be redundant, but on some level it makes sense. Also a foreign power can't stop trade totally unless one damages both canals.

Posted by: Desertfox Jan 9 2006, 03:24 PM
I think the 1906 date for finishing the Darien canal is a tad early. After all you have Culebra to contend with. But I give the Darien canal a much better chance of succeding then the French one.

Now if you happened to move the expected opening date of the Darien canal to 1908, we could inagurate the "Great Canal Race" cool.gif Either that or we'll just have to build the Beleriand canal faster!

OOC It apperes that war between NS and France has been averted.

Posted by: JLDOGG Jan 9 2006, 03:39 PM
UMMMMMMMM
Confused unsure.gif
2 or 3 Canals????

Gran Columbia=Darien Canal(OTL panama canal)
and
the New Beleriand Canal

The French Project 3???

where???
blink.gif blink.gif

Posted by: Ithekro Jan 9 2006, 05:24 PM
The French Canal Project is being dug within 100 miles of the Costa Rican Border with Panama...so in Costa Rica (New Rhun). So Costa Rica could be divided from the rest of Central America by canals if both projects were completed, in addition to the traditional canal in Panama.

I have a map at home for roughly the locations of the two canal zones in Costa Rica.


Posted by: The Rock Doctor Jan 9 2006, 05:30 PM
The historical canal took about eight years of actual work - ten if you count the planning and mobilization.

The Darien Canal started in 1890 - check the original NPC files to confirm this is consistent - so is currently starting its twelfth year of work, with five more expected. Considering that this is the historical canal with a different name, I think the timeframe is sufficient, and perhaps even pessimistic.


Posted by: Ithekro Jan 9 2006, 07:21 PM
Here are the other two canal zones....roughly

http://img.photobucket.com/albums/v514/ithekro/canals1.gif

Posted by: swamphen Jan 11 2006, 06:58 PM
As noted elsewhere, the DKB has purchased two shares of the NB canal...

Posted by: Ithekro Jan 11 2006, 07:26 PM
Rohan of course is in, otherwise the land could not be used.

Posted by: Ithekro Jan 17 2006, 09:02 PM
This is actually for all that are building canals in Centeral America:


What are the dimentions of the largest vessel that will be able to fit though your canals when they finish?

This might help nations like France that have put forth requests for maximum battleships as a foreign defense policy. And Rohan which is increasing ship size at a relatively steady pace. And for freighters, liners, and traders that way or many not be able to use said canals.

Posted by: Desertfox Jan 22 2006, 05:04 PM
QUOTE
What are the dimentions of the largest vessel that will be able to fit though your canals when they finish?
I missed it. Sorry

Take the historical dimensions of the Panama canal, for the Beleriand canal. One of the advamtages of the Nicaraguan location is that since the locks are only in the Pacific-Lake Nicaragua section they are easier to upgrade.


Posted by: Maddox Jan 23 2006, 12:07 AM
QUOTE
What are the dimentions of the largest vessel that will be able to fit though your canals when they finish?


France is megalomaniac. So if France gets plans from the others about size, they'll have to go bigger with at least 25%. Especialy wider.

Also, now with the UKA participating, I expect to see some miracles of Modern steam enginering.

Posted by: The Rock Doctor Jan 23 2006, 12:55 AM
The historical dimensions are 304.8 x 33.53 metres. Not especially tidy figures considering Gran Colombia works with the metric system.

So Gran Colombia will build to a nice 300 x 40 metre capacity. Might be a little wide, but meh...there's no shortage of labor.

Posted by: Ithekro Jan 23 2006, 01:15 AM
Okay so the figures we have are rougly as follows:

New Beleriand Canal: 304.8 meters long by 33.53 meters wide (1,000 feet by 110 feet).

Gran Columbia's Canal: 300 meters long by 40 meters wide (984 feet 3 inches by 131 feet 2 inches).

Grand Canal: 381 meters long by 50 meters wide (1,250 feet by 164 feet).

Does depth matter or will the locks be able to handle just about anything we can think of logically at this time?

Posted by: Maddox Jan 23 2006, 01:43 AM
I'm thinking about setting up a kind of "mishap or advance" table.

You can influence these "dicetrows" with stories about the build.

For example, Culebra cut was a bitch to work, especialy when it was raining. Lots of landslides and such. You can luck out, our you can run out of luck.

Now, the stories don't have to be "Glorious" reports of the well going works. Like Premier Jardan has noticed. Reports can be too " optimistic".


Anyone in favor?

Posted by: The Rock Doctor Jan 23 2006, 10:46 AM
It's not an unreasonable idea. So long as one accounts for factors like starting date, size of work force, and so on, it could be done.

That said - I don't want to have to become an expert in canals, or to have to post something every quarter, as that would start to make for some monotonous news.
The first purpose of a warship is to remain afloat. Anon.
Below 40 degrees, there is no law. Below 50 degrees, there is no God. sailor's maxim on weather in the Southern seas

Borys

#7
Stolen from the Warships1 forum, a post by Penglodoh. I'm not linking, as ezBoards are purged every few weeks and old posts gone.
Borys



Superior is debatable. From the statistics, R is not superior than Bayern (according to Breyer, p.171):

armour detail--------Revenge--------Bayern-
barbette A(front/side/rear)--10"/10/7"---13.8"/13.8"/13.8"
barbette B(front/side/rear)--7"/10"/7"---13.8"/13.8"/13.8"
barbette C(front/side/rear)--7"/10"/7"---13.8"/13.8"/9.8"
barbette D(front/side/rear)--7"/10"/10"--13.8"/13.8"/13.8"
---------------------------------------------------------------
barbette, below weather deck:
A(front/side/rear)--10"/10"/7"---13.8"/13.8"/9.8"
B(front/side/rear)--7"/10"/6"----13.8"/13.8"/9.8"
C(front/side/rear)--6"/10"/6"----9.8"/13.8"/13.8"
D(front/side/rear)--7"/10"/9"----13.8"/13.8"/13.8"
---------------------------------------------------------------
barbette, at armour deck level:
A(front/side/rear)--6"/6"/6"-----3.1"/3.1"/3.1"
B(front/side/rear)--6"/6"/4"-----3.1"/3.1"/3.1"
C(front/side/rear)--0/0/0*------1.6"/1.6"/1.6"
D(front/side/rear)--4"/6"/6"*---1.6"/1.6"/1.6"

*below armour deck
---------------------------------------------------------------
gun turrets:
front:----------------13"---------13.8"
front slope:---------4"----------7.9"
roof:-----------------4"----------4.7"
sides:---------------11"---------9.8"

---------------------------------------------------------------
main guns: The turrets and Barbettes of Bayern are generally better armoured than those of "R", which is of some significance as turret damage is a critical aspect. No armour on "R"´s turrets or barbettes could keep out 15" projectiles.
---------------------------------------------------------------
sec. guns in casemattes:
(front/surrounding)--6"/0"------6.7"/0.8"
---------------------------------------------------------------
sec. guns: The missing splinter protection between the secondary casematte guns on "R" attracts fluke hits as demonstrated on Valiant at Jutland
---------------------------------------------------------------
conning tower:
main(front/sides/roof)-11"/11"/6"-13.8"/13.8"/7"
comm-tubes, main-----3"+6"-------2.75"+7.9"
aft(front/sides/roof)---6"/6"/4"-----7.9"/7.9"/6.7"
comm-tubes, aft-------4"------------6.7"
---------------------------------------------------------------
The armour protection of the vital command & communication areas outside the vitals are better protected on Bayern.
---------------------------------------------------------------
deck armour:
weatherdeck(fore/mid/aft)-0"/1"/0"--0"/1.2"-1.6"/0"
armour deck(mag./eng.)---6"/1"-2"------1.96"/1.2"
over steering gear----------1"+4"-----4.7"
ship ends (fore/aft)--------1"+2.1"/3"-4"---1.2"/3.9"
---------------------------------------------------------------
The deck armour of "R" shows a superior strengthened main armour deck. The deck protection of Bayern relies on destruction of projectiles due to fuze delay rather than on own strength.
---------------------------------------------------------------
side armour:
torp. bulkhead(mag./eng)--1.5"/1"---1.96"/1.96"
ship ends--------------------4"-6"------1.2"-7.9"(bow)/3.9"(stern)
main belt--------------13"--------13.8"
lower belt-------------13"--------13.8"-6.7"(tapered)
upper belt-------------6"---------9.8"
splinterbelt-----------0"----------1.2"-3.1"
slope-------------------2"---------1.2"
main belt coverage: 57,3%----60,4%
---------------------------------------------------------------
The side protection of Bayern seems to me both, covering a larger area as well as beeing substantially thicker and better arranged with the splinterbelt behind for most. In case of Revenge, the torpedo bulkhead does not join the armour deck (there is a 1 deck deep gap), while in case of Bayern, the torpedo bulkhead goes straight up to the weatherdeck (over main armour deck acting as splinter bulkhead)
--------------------------------------------------------------
total armour----------8.250t.----11.428t.
--------------------------------------------------------------
Terry, I have to conclude that Revenge´s armour is inferior to that of Bayern in both, distribution and thickness in almost every area except for deck armour.
Regarding speed in service I have my doubts as well. The fastest "R" was Revenge, which developed 42.962 SHP and 21.9 Kts on the trial. The fastest Bayern was Bayern, developing 42.000 SHP (on Ruhr coal) and 22.0 Kts (ssems to me a bit odd as this doesn´t represent trial speeds). Not much to tell between them. Baden & Bayern were both ordered to the 1st SG post Jutland (for the time Seydlitz & Derfflinger were still in repairs) because of their good service speed.
Regarding firepower, I cannot agree as well. True, Revenge has much heavier shells but neither does it enjoi a range advantage nor a penetration advantage over the 38cm/45. As the 38cm/45 is a QF gun, it enjois a significant advantage in volume of fire over "R"´s guns:c 20 rounds/minute vs 16 rounds per minute at rapid firing.
The same appears for the sec. guns, the hoists of the Bayern class allow a higher rate of fire and hence a better volume of fire as well.
The claim of better subdivision of "R" is rather dubious to me. Bayern&Baden got the large torpedo flat braodside rooms subdivided, Revenge kept them in original condition by 1918.
The stability of Bayern is also superior to the 5.4ft. metcantric height of "R", allowing for greater flooding tolerances. The pumping capacity of Bayern and the general training in anti flooding practices is way superior to that of any RN ship of 1918.
At all, Bayern is more resistent to heavy gunfire than Revenge following the statistics. I know that the RN made an evaluation of Baden which partly claimed the opposite but these docs are not accessable for verification. Would be interesting to see them as I cannot see how Revenge could fight a Bayern from a superior position!
NEDS - Not Enough Deck Space for all those guns and torpedos;
Bambi must DIE!

Borys

This time I do add the link:
http://p216.ezboard.com/fwarships1discussionboardsfrm1.showMessage?topicID=8299.topic

Goodalls report Dear Terry, I have only seen excerpts from the reports, which are not discussed in detail, much of it can be found on HMS Hood?s webpage. Anyway, good material, worth beeing published and analysed properly.

    Quote:The watertight bulkheads were pierced by voice pipes and electrical cables and were far from watertight, whilst the anti-flash arrangements were far below what would have been acceptable in the RN at the time. Also the habitability was so poor it wouldnt have passed RN requirements yet alone the US standards!



That does not belong to the principal transverse bulkheads in BAYERN (exception: the forward torpedo tube, which was removed but left a fairly large hole in the forward transverse bulkhead at frame 177) nor to the torpedo bulkhead. It does belong to the bulkheads made of construction grade material, esspeccially those outside the vitals and the armoured slope due to coal resupply amidships. The voice pipes hat shut off ventiles for each compartement. Progressive flooding was expected to be higher in Baden than in R. The anti flash arrangements were not far below to what have been acceptable. The correct phrase just says that RN practice is better by 1918 standarts. But it has to be better! British ships were still using cordite in silk bags, which is much more volatile than RPC in brass cases used by the germans as records proof.
The habitability indeed was poor.


    Quote:The German magazines were a nighmare, and the RoF was far below that of the Royal Sovereigns. The magazine suffered a poor layout, that would mean that the initial RoF would be about 2 RPM, but the later rounds would have to be fetched from much further from the hoists, leading to a ROF of below 1 RPM.


I am not sure about the magazines, Campbell doesn?t mention any problems with the hoists or magazines and Bayern reportedly achieved a cyclic rate of fire of 24 sec. including all transfers and there is some evidence of faster firing during operation Albion with C and D turrets (A and B were compromised by the mine hit). It indeed seems to me a faster firing gun than the british 15" design.
www.navweaps.com/Weapons/..._skc13.htm
Beside this, a comparative report of both guns says that the barrel life of the british gun was lower than that of the german gun ("Progress in Gunnery Material, 1921" ADM 186/251, www.navweaps.com/Weapons/..._mk1.htm):

As regards (i), the life of our guns (about 325 E.F.C.) is apparently considerably less than that of German heavy guns owing to their use of cooler propellant.

There is evidence that the 38cmL45 penetrated 13.23" of ww1 KC armour at 200hm (21872 yards). Compare: 11" at 19.707 yards for the 15"/42 (probably not using Greenboy), resp. ~11.8" at 20.000 yards with Greenboy projectiles.

A drop in cyclic fire rate below 1 rpm is not recorded in any german gun manual of this particular gun, nor does Paul Schmalenbach mentions this in his books. If there is evidence for such, can You point me to the relevant source, please or do You refer to:

ADM 186/251 notes that the shell grabs and the foot grip plating used in the shell rooms were both very efficient and should be copied in future British designs. However, it also notes that the Auxiliary Loading Chamber was "both a poor and an elaborate arrangement." The Auxiliary Loading Chamber allowed an "alternate supply of six projectiles per gun to be sent to the gun-house by means of an electrically driven hoist. There is no ready means of replenishing the secondary loading compartment from the shell room."

?

    Quote:The total weights for armour are a little deceptive as the British ship has a much deeper main thickness on the belt and far superior deck armour. The Bayern has far more light armour, spread all over, neither capable of defeating a heavy round or thin enough to fail to set off the fuse.



To this I cannot agree. You really have to look for a detailed area, where Bayern has inferior protection to Revenge. Indeed, Bayern enjois armour protection beeing a magnitude better in key aspects, such as barbette, turret & CT armour, which do make up for 25-30% of the hittable area, depending on distance.
The main belt of Revenge is not deeper than that of Bayern. Comparing the armour schemes of both, I can see that Revenge does has an advantage in an armour belt, which isn?t tapered down underwater (like those of Bayern). However, the belt of Bayern is thicker above the waterline, wherever You compare it. A 13" untapered belt doesn?t make much sense deeply underwater. Bayerns 350mm to 180mm taper of the belt goes 23cm deeper underwater than Revenge?s main belt, thus the belt of Bayern is deeper, indeed and provides better protection against diving projectiles. Bayerns main belt does also cover more waterline length!
The deck armour of Revenge is only in one key area superior: The main magazine decks, where it has 6" thickness.Over the turbine spaces it has a thickness of 2" and over the raised boiler decks only 1". A hit in the boiler rooms would be easier on Revenge than would it be on Bayern. Note that the deck of Revenge is placed one level higher, which gives more protected volume but also eases penetration via 6" upper side belt. Even the slope with 2" does not provide better protection over Bayern: The slope is declined 30 deg from the vertical while Bayerns 1.2" slope is declined 60 deg. from the vertical and enjois coal bunker protection there + the torpedo bulkhead behind (Revenge does miss this critical protection figure, there is a gap behind the slope).
The medium armour, particularely the 9.8" upper side belt of Bayern is at least strong enough to prevent major calibre obliquily penetrations from all but close distances as Jutland prooved (only once was 10.23" defeated by a 15" projectile from a distance of ~9.000 yards and almost perfect 10 deg. impact obliquity, when the soft AP-caps works properly as could be expected). Compare it with the "R"?s barbettes, which are also designed to withstand obliquity hits, their thickest part is 10" (only 0.2" more than Bayerns upper side belt and 0.23" less than the barbette of DERFFLINGER, which was defeated by the soft capped 15" round). I cannot say that 9.8" aren?t providing any protection for ww1 tech. projectiles, esspeccially with a 1.2"-3.1" splinter bulkhead and the coal bunker behind. Probably not at 10.000 yards against Greenboy-projectiles but at 18.000 yards probably, depending on impact obliquity even earlier.
To summarize the shortcomings of Revenge class armour scheme:

1.) insufficiant barbette protection, even on their thickest parts (probably good enough to offer some degree of protection against soft capped 14" projectiles but insufficiant to keep out hard capped 15" shells).
2.) insufficiant turret protection, esspeccially of the roofs to protect vs. 14" or 15" shells

1.&2. are critical shortcomings due to the use of cordite as main propellant.

3.) inferior protection of the vital communication and controll posts of the conning tower (both, the conning tower itself as well as the communication tubes running down to the ships controll room). The armour here should be comparable to the armour of the side belts. There is evidence that the 38cmL45 penetrated 13.23" of ww1 KC armour at 200hm (21872 yards), which would mean that the co&com?s do have no IZ in the worst case.

4.) less protected waterline in comparison to Bayern (but more protected volume). The problem is that Revenge has a very low metacentric longitudinal stability, which would make flooding of the bow much more of a problem than for Bayern.

5.) weaknesses in the armour scheme:
a) the untapered belt underwater don?t reach deep enough to stop modest diving shells (Bayern is not much better either but at least not that weak). A taper of the underwater portion of the belt would make look the belt better in this respect.
b) the torpedo bulkhead doesn?t join the deck armour on several areas amidships, which makes for a gap in the protection once a projectile defeated the slope via main belt / upper side belt penetration first. A difficult task for a 12" projectile but not impossible for a 15" round to find the way.
c) The missed splinter protection for the casemates (only casemate front shields). A single hit may knock out the whole battery as demonstrated on Malaya during Jutland (which came close to the loss of the ship). Bayern does have armour against splinters for the enclosure of every casemate station.
d) The missing splinter belt behind the side belt, which could endanger wide areas inside of the ship even by means of non penetrating damage

6.) inferior upper side belt. 6" is good enough to stop sec. gun impacts and provides some degree of protection against 11" and even 12" projectiles under certain circumstances (a considerable target angle) but cannot be expected to stop 15" projectiles. The upper side belt of R (unlike that of Bayern) therefore only acts as fuze activator against Bayerns guns.

7.) Inferior main belt thickness. The Bayern does have 13.78" KC (can be penetrated out to 18.000 yards by Revenge?s guns, estimated*) versus 13.0" KC-typed on Revenge (can be penetrated out to 20.000-21.000 yards by Bayern?s guns, estimated*). Both belts are not tapered above the waterline and Revenge?s belt alone is not tapered below the waterline.

*) estimation:

Much is known about the ballistics of the 15"L42 but far less about the 38cmL45.
the penetration figures posted here:
www.navweaps.com/Weapons/..._skc13.htm

for the 38cmL45 have to be modified. Both guns (the 38cmL45 and Bismarcks 38cmL52) were compared in 1938 against the state of the art armour, Krupp cementated new, not against ww1 type of armour.
A simple run of FH v.5.8 shows how different the results are. KCnew armour is about 16.5876% more effective in stopping power than is british cementated 1911-1925. Therefore 10.43" penetration of KCn at 21.872 yards equals to ~12.16" penetration of british ww1 period KC or 12.62" of Krupp-old. Not exactly the reported 13.23" of ww1 type (probably Krupp old) armour but I suspect this is a bit high for an everyday result and therefore may belong to an inferior plate or may not.
The effective penetration of 13.78" KC via FH v.5.8 gives ~15.000 yards for Greenboy projectiles and 2467 fps muzzle velocity. Full penetration does occur as soon as 18.000 yards.
NEDS - Not Enough Deck Space for all those guns and torpedos;
Bambi must DIE!